Ever since Gerald Gould first challenged the univocally patriotic interpretations of Shakespeare’s *Henry V* by revealing the dramatic ironies in the play that expose Henry’s hypocrisy, critical response to the play’s monarch has been largely polarized for much of the twentieth century: critics have either celebrated Henry as a virtuous Christian monarch whose glorious deeds are performed in benevolent service to the English commonweal, or they have touted Henry as a conniving and self-interested Machiavel whose seemingly virtuous façade belies his ambition for power and political self-aggrandizement. Striving to transcend these bifurcated critical responses in his seminal article ‘Rabbits, Ducks, and *Henry V*’ (1977), Norman Rabkin proposed that the play dares its readers to ‘choose one of the two opposed interpretations’ of Henry even as it demonstrates the coexistence — albeit the impossible simultaneity — of these antithetical interpretations: Henry, as Rabkin claims, is an ambiguous rabbit-duck who leaves audiences and readers in a limbo of critical uncertainty by asking them to hold in equilibrium Henry’s incompatible qualities of Christian king and Machiavellian

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While Rabkin identifies Henry’s ambiguity as an effect, he nevertheless attributes this effect to the conflict between Henry’s ‘private’ and ‘public’ selves in asserting that Henry trades his idiosyncratic ‘inwardness for the sake of power’ and, in so doing, appeals to a psychological and anachronistic notion of character. However, since Henry is a polyvocal ‘chameleon linguist’ who ‘reflects in his speech not himself, but the expectations of those to whom he speaks’, as P.K. Ayers has aptly noted, it is more relevant to the debate about Henry’s indeterminacy as a character to examine his use of rhetoric. I thus shift the critical focus away from determining who or what Henry is to scrutinizing how his rhetorical performances generate his moral ambiguity. I will show that Henry’s ambiguity as a ‘rabbit’ and a ‘duck’ stems not from his ontology as a character but from what he ‘does’ with his words.

Disregarding Henry’s linguistic agency and his rhetorical performances, New Historicist critics and their heirs made Henry’s speech a function of socio-historic and political discourses in the play. Henry became the impersonal mouthpiece for a dominant English language that contains the subversion instigated by the multiple dialects and linguistic groups in the play: Paola Pugliatti claims that Henry ‘submit[s], disfigur[es], or turn[s] [...] into some form of “English”’ the polyphony of those voices in the play that offer a subversive ‘form of resistance to cultural integration’, while critics like Michael Neill, who concentrate on the play’s construction of English nationhood, similarly deem Henry’s speech to be synonymous with a conquering English tongue that domesticates and appropriates the ‘other’ languages in the play which challenge its hegemonic power. Although some critics like Stephen Greenblatt

and Claire McEachern do attend to Henry’s rhetoric, they nevertheless deny the self-referentiality of his speech: Greenblatt deems that Hal’s imitations of his subjects’ speech are emblematic of the monarch’s power to contain subversive elements within his kingdom, while McEachern observes that Henry’s St. Crispin’s day speech — which expresses his simultaneous fantasy of social union and the desire for social hierarchy — instantiates the ‘fellowship and hegemony’ inhering in the Elizabethan discourse of corporate identity that is personified by the monarch.\(^7\)

While critics influenced by the pragmatic recovery of speech as a performative utterance have refocused their attention to Henry’s linguistic agency and his rhetorical performance of kingship, they have tended to exclude from their analyses the tension inherent to Henry’s linguistic manoeuvring and his strategic self-fashioning in discourse.\(^8\) Although critics in the past two decades have perceived that Henry uses language to instrumentally negotiate his identity as a monarch, they have failed to recognize that it is this particular use of language, which encodes his struggle with negotiating an identity, that not only succeeds but also fails. Despite the praise that critics have liberally bestowed on Henry as a master rhetorician, there has been a dearth of discussion concerning how Henry pragmatically uses rhetoric to negotiate his power in social discourse: Joseph A. Porter, among the first critics to apply J. L. Austin’s speech-act theory to Shakespeare’s characters, shows that Henry’s speech is characterized by illocutionary acts (such as vowing, swearing, and taking oaths) only to conclude that these acts reveal his concern with redeeming time; linguistic literary critic Roger D. Sell refers to Henry as a ‘communicative king’ but does not address how Henry uses rhetoric to adapt himself to his audience pragmatically; and, more recently,


\(^8\) See, for instance, Peter Parolin who explores Henry’s ‘godly self-presentation’ through rhetoric but claims that this self-presentation is undermined by rhetoric itself, which has the ‘power to misrepresent persuasively’ (‘Figuring the King in Henry V: Political Rhetoric and the Limits of Performance’, Journal of the Wooden O Symposium, 9 [2009], 43-60 [pp. 49, 50]).
David Schalkwyk, foregrounding the persuasive function of Henry’s speech, reveals that Henry displaces the illocutionary force of his performative utterances onto performance itself. Schalkwyk argues that, due to his father’s usurpation of the Yorkist throne, Henry’s ‘speech acts of right’ become ‘mere performance’ and it is this ‘movement between performative and performance’ that accounts for Henry’s oscillation between a ‘rabbit’ and a ‘duck’.

While Schalkwyk’s reading of Henry’s verbal displacements may underscore Henry’s inability to translate words into deeds and thus signal his failure as a king, it need not necessarily register his failure as an orator.

Focusing on Henry as an orator rather than a king, I demonstrate that Henry’s moral ambiguity is a linguistic effect produced by his pragmatic use of rhetoric. Adopting a pragma-rhetorical approach to Henry’s speech in his exchanges with Canterbury, his lords, and his soldiers, I explore how Henry’s overt statements which build his ethos—what Austin would call his ‘constative’ use of language—contradict what his words.

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10 Schalkwyk, pp. 204, 200. In J.L. Austin’s terminology, an illocutionary act is an utterance that, once pronounced, causes a change in state or condition (Austin gives the example of ‘I do’ uttered during a wedding ceremony, which instantaneously turns the speaker into husband or wife) whereas a perlocutionary act is an utterance that has either intended or unintended effects on the hearer (the utterance can persuade, deter, mislead, etc.). Illocutionary and perlocutionary acts are both ‘performatives’ since they ‘do’ things or act upon reality. See J. L. Austin, *How to do Things with Words*, ed. by J. O. Urmson and Marina Sbisìa, 2nd edn (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), pp. 5, 107-8.

11 I join critics such as Jonathan Culpeper and Lynne Magnusson, who similarly make use of pragmatics to explore the ‘impressions’ produced by speakers in drama; see Jonathan Culpeper, *Language and Characterisation: People in Plays and Other Texts* (Harlow, UK: Longman, 2001), and Lynne Magnusson, *Shakespeare and Social Dialogue: Dramatic Language and Elizabethan Letters* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). Neither Magnusson nor Culpeper discuss Henry. Here, I focus on the Henry of the Folio, since his shortened speeches in the Quarto neither instantiate his use of rhetorical ethos nor lend themselves to ambivalent readings.
‘do’ or his performative use of language. In other words, I examine how Henry’s use of rhetoric undercuts the ethos that his constative utterances proclaim he has. I argue that Henry’s logos, or argumentative use of rhetoric, inadvertently undermines his ethos as a virtuous and plain-speaking Christian monarch which he strives to construct and thus generates the suspicion of his Machiavellianism. This variance between Henry’s logos and his ethos — two complementary rhetorical appeals — intersects with the dramatic irony framing his encounters with his interlocutors to produce critics’ impression of his moral ambivalence. Reading Henry as a consummate orator whose ethos is not pre-discursive but rhetorically constructed through language to facilitate persuasion effectively avoids the ontological quandary stemming from the misguided critical assumption that Henry harbours an inner and a priori self.

While classical rhetoric has traditionally been conceived of as a mode of persuasion, contemporary philosophical theories of rhetoric employ pragmatics to re-conceptualize rhetoric as a cognitive art of interpretation grounded in inference. Beginning in the 1950s, language philosophers Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca revived Aristotle’s notion of rhetoric as ‘a practical discipline that aims [...] at exerting through speech a persuasive action on an audience’; the speaker, they claim, seeks not only to persuade but also to convey an argument. Resuscitating Aristotle’s notion of rhetoric as the counterpart of dialectic, neo-Aristotelians Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca abandoned the reductive, Ramist conception of rhetoric as an ornamental ‘art of expression’ or ‘style’ to reconceive rhetoric as a theory of argumentation. Their so-called ‘New Rhetoric’ is predicated on argumentation or discursive logic rather than on deduction and abstraction which characterize formal logic. Argumentation, as ‘the

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12 Constative statements ‘describe’ reality or ‘report’ a fact that may be true or untrue; see Austin, p. 5.
15 Formal logic involves extracting a hypothesis already present in the premise(s) and formulating a conclusion that has general truth value. Informal logic (argumentation), however, ‘debates without establishing one conclusion in a decisive and necessary way, and [...] makes acceptance subjective instead of placing it in an objective field’ (Michel Meyer, ‘Toward a Rhetoric of Reason’, Rhetoric
domain of [...] the credible, the plausible, the probable’, is dialogic: it rests on the interaction between the orator (speaker) who seeks to persuade and the audience (hearer) who is disposed to listen, with the aim of ‘obtaining or reinforcing the adherence of the audience to [...] [the orator’s] thesis’. Audience-oriented for the purpose of achieving ‘adherence’ — and ultimate assent — to the orator’s thesis, argumentation relies on the orator’s discursive use of rhetoric to both induce this adherence and respond to the audience’s psychological expectations, exigencies, and desires; rhetorical tropes and schemes hence involve inference on the audience’s part. For Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, the success of the orator’s argumentation thus rests neither on the argument’s deductive or inductive correctness nor on an abstract standard of truth in accordance with which the truth or falsity of the thesis may be judged, but on the argument’s rhetorical effectiveness — in pragmatic terms, its perlocutionary effect — as measured by the degree of the audience’s adherence to the thesis. The speaker’s rhetorical persuasiveness, then, is contingent on a flawless deployment of discursive logic which undergirds his use of tropes and schemes and serves to compel the audience to believe his thesis. Contained within a social network of speakers and hearers, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s ‘New Rhetoric’ delivers a cognitive theory of rhetoric in which tropes and schemes have argumentative-persuasive force instead of a merely expressive function.

Nevertheless, the assumption underlying Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s rhetorical theory of argumentation is that the orator’s intention to persuade the audience necessarily coheres with his intention to communicate his argument, through discursive logic, to the audience. As language philosophers Jésus Larrazabal and Kepa Korta have pointed out, even though persuasive and communicative intentions may be ‘distinguish[ed] and combin[ed]’ in persuasive discourse, they coexist on different levels: while the intention to communicate is overt, the intention to persuade tends to be covert. Proposing a ‘pragma-rhetorical’ approach to persuasive discourse, Larrazabal and Korta build on the work of Marcelo Dascal and Alan Gross, who fuse pragmatics...
with Aristotelian rhetoric. Dascal and Gross take Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s notion of persuasion as ‘a kind of communicative interaction’ one step further by assessing not only the hearer’s ability to grasp the meaning behind the speaker’s utterance (what Austin calls ‘illocutionary uptake’) but also the effect of the utterance on the hearer’s actions or beliefs. While Dascal and Gross agree that effective persuasion is premised on the audience’s ability to correctly infer the speaker’s intention, they also recognize the ‘possibility of misdirection and deception’ in persuasive discourse: whereas successful communication is premised on the hearer’s recognition of the speaker’s intention, persuasion ‘may depend on the [hearer’s] lack of recognition’ of the speaker’s intent to deceive.

Although I adopt the ‘pragma-rhetorical’ method propounded by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca and coined by Larrazabal and Korta, I do not interpret Henry in light of Dascal and Gross’s overt and covert intentions, for doing so would mean positing that Henry’s Machiavellianism precedes and secretly motivates his speech and hence lies at the core of his character. Henry, however, is not the innately evil or deceptive schemer that Richard III is. While Henry’s intention to persuade his audience of his ethos as a Christian monarch is certainly overt, his proclivity to rhetorically perform an ethos he does not yet possess in order to legitimate his actions is what gives rise to our belief in his Machiavellian nature; Henry’s Machiavellianism is thus an effect of his verbal behaviour.

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20 Dascal and Gross, pp. 110, 109. As an example of speaker deception, Dascal and Gross offer Searle’s WWII scenario of a British soldier held hostage by an Italian. The British soldier speaks to his Italian interrogator in German to persuade him that he is German ‘by means of [the hearer’s] not understanding [the speaker’s] intention to do so’ (p. 110) so that he can be released. The British soldier thus ‘induce[s] a false belief as to his true intention’ in order to gain his freedom. The interrogator’s belief that the British soldier is German rests on his recognition of the soldier’s overt intention to communicate his nationality to him, even though he remains oblivious to the soldier’s covert intention to deceive him.

21 The Machiavel, a stock dramatic character on the Elizabethan stage, is a manipulative schemer with self-serving goals who employs realpolitik virtù (commonly glossed as prowess, martial strength, or ruthlessness) to achieve and maintain his power. Although Machiavelli declares that the ruler ‘should not deviate from the good, if possible’, he qualifies this counsel by saying that the ruler should nevertheless know how to practice deception ‘if necessary’: ‘it is unnecessary for a prince to have all the good qualities […] but it is very necessary to appear to have them. […] to appear to have them is useful; to appear merciful, faithful, humane, religious, upright, and to be so, but with a mind so framed that should you require not to be so, you may be able and know how to change to the opposite’ (Niccolo Machiavelli, chap. 18, in *The Prince*, trans. by W.K. Marriott [London: Dent, 1958], p. 99; italics mine); see also Quentin Skinner’s gloss in *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought: Volume I: The Renaissance*
rather than on divine right due to his father’s usurpation of the throne, are disrupted by the discursive logic of his utterances, which reveal his plan to ‘win’ his right and reclaim his legitimacy by invading France. The modern, pragma-rhetorical conception of rhetoric I adopt closely resembles Shakespeare’s own understanding of rhetoric as a persuasive art that is, broadly construed, a performative discourse informed by and inhering in the argumentation structuring the pedagogical exercise of *disputatio in utramque partem* (debating both sides of a question) which enables speakers to rhetorically construct and logically convey verbal actions.  

As an orator, Henry consummately employs Aristotle’s three *pisteis* of persuasion (ethos, pathos, and logos) but the dissonance between his ethos and logos renders Henry dubious. Ethos, for Aristotle, which denotes the orator’s personal character or moral and intellectual self-image, is established discursively without recourse to the orator’s past actions or behaviour; the orator’s speech does not serve to reveal character but rhetorically constructs an image of character. Although the Aristotelian orator should appear to be a good and trustworthy person, he need not necessarily be so: it is only crucial that the orator establishes the impression of trustworthiness and credibility in order to gain the audience’s confidence and compel their belief in the truthfulness of his speech. The grounds for establishing the orator’s reliability are good moral character

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22 See Ronald Knowles, who illustrates that Shakespeare’s history plays are informed by various forms of argument (*Shakespeare’s Arguments with History* [New York: Palgrave, 2002], p. 18) and Russ McDonald, who charts how rhetorical training involving the *in utramque partem* model in the schoolroom infiltrated and complicated Shakespeare’s plays (‘Rhetoric and Renaissance Theater’, in *The Oxford Handbook of Rhetorical Studies*, ed. by Michael J. MacDonald [New York: Oxford University Press, 2015]; online only: pp. 1-15).


24 It should be noted that Aristotle’s emphasis on the orator’s appearance of ethos is not Machiavellian, since rhetorical ethos is intertwined with his idea of the ‘Good’ (see Nan Johnson, ‘Ethos and the Aims of Rhetoric’, in *Essays on Classical Rhetoric and Modern Discourse*, ed. by Robert J. Connors, Lisa S. Ede,
or virtue (arete), good will (eunoia), and good sense or prudence (phronesis), which are all intricately interwoven: virtue, according to James Kinneavy and Susan Warshauer, is grounded in the orator’s ability to ‘gauge society’s [cultural] values’, such as ‘courage, justice, temperance’, and ‘display them’ in his speech; good will rests on the speaker’s ability to relate to his audience by exhibiting and affirming the prejudices, values, aspirations, and emotions he shares with them and thus bespeaks his good intentions; and prudence, or ‘moral knowledge and right action’, is the ability to deliberate and ‘make practical decisions’, which is buttressed by the speaker’s moral character that directs his practical thinking to select an appropriate means ‘to achieve an [appropriate] end’. While ethos differs from speech-oriented logos and audience-oriented pathos in being speaker-oriented, it nevertheless relies on both the appeals of logos (logic) and pathos (emotion) for its persuasive force and shares an inextricable bond with logos. As Eugene Garver notes, logos — manifested by the enthymeme — is ‘the primary evidence for [being persuaded by] speech’s ethos’ for ‘if the enthymeme is the body of proof, ethos is its soul’. Not only must the orator’s ethos be consistent with logos but it must also be consistently presented and upheld in the orator’s speech in order to maintain his image. Henry’s ethos as a Christian monarch, however, is notably inconsistent since it is constantly destabilized by his deviant logos which neither reinforces nor complements the ethos he presents.

Although Henry discursively presents himself as a pious, peace-loving, and honest Christian king who abides by Christian principles in the opening scene with Ely and Canterbury, his ethos is undercut by his performative use of modal verbs which reveal a mode of reasoning that is dissonant with his assumed Christian virtue: the modal verbs communicate Henry’s intent to wage war against France under the pretext of persuading

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25 Kinneavy and Warshauer, pp. 175, 176, 179, 178. Virtue, good will, and prudence can be exhibited either through direct statements or indirectly through pathos and logical proofs.

26 Eugene Garver, Aristotle’s Rhetoric: An Art of Character (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), pp. 195, 175. ‘Enthymeme’ is the rhetorical name for the syllogism in logic. Aristotle regards logos as the most important rhetorical appeal.

27 See Kennedy, p. 82.

28 Erasmus quotes Julius Pollux to enumerate the God-like qualities of a Christian king: ‘mild, peaceful, lenient, foresighted, just, humane, magnanimous, frank [...] rational [...] sound in his advice, [...] just, sensible, mindful of religious matters [...] slowly moved to vengeance; [...] true, constant, unbending, prone to the side of justice’ (171). The king establishes his authority through ‘wisdom, then integrity, self-restraint’ (The Education of a Christian Prince, trans. by Lester K. Born [New York: Octagon Books, 1965], pp. 171, 209; see also pp. 162-63 for a description of a good king).
Canterbury and Ely of his virtuous disdain for the same. Henry establishes his ethos directly in his opening monologue. In soliciting the advice of his ‘learnèd’ (1.2.9)29 and religious counsellors before making a decision about war, Henry exhibits his *phronesis* as he invokes God in his warning to Canterbury that the latter speak the ‘truth’ in ‘justly and religiously’ (1.2.10) unfolding the reasoning behind the Salic Law so as to prevent the outbreak of war:

> And God forbid, my dear and faithful lord,  
> That you should fashion, wrest, or bow your reading,  
> Or nicely charge your understanding soul  
> With opening titles miscreate, whose right  
> Suits not in native colours with the truth;  
> For God doth know how many now in health  
> Shall drop their blood in approbation  
> Of what your reverence shall incite us to.  
> Therefore take heed how you impawn our person,  
> How you awake our sleeping sword of war;  
> We charge you in the name of God take heed.  
> For never two such kingdoms did contend  
> Without much fall of blood, whose guiltless drops  
> Are every one a woe, a sore complaint  
> ’Gainst him whose wrongs give edge unto the swords  
> That makes such waste in brief mortality.  
> Under this conjuration speak, my lord,  
> For we will hear, note, and believe in heart  
> That what you speak is in your conscience washed  
> As pure as sin with baptism. (1.2.13-32)

In calling for an ethical and Neoplatonic correspondence between word (*verba*) and thing (*res*) or between ‘right’ (16) and ‘truth’ (17), Henry implies his allegiance and obedience to a higher moral authority, which accentuates his *arete*; a legal right to the French crown should correspond to a moral right.30 In further warning Canterbury not to

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30 Henry nevertheless conflates legal right with moral right. After Canterbury’s excursus on the Salic Law, Henry’s equivocation on ‘right’ in his question ‘May I with right and conscience make this claim?’ (I. 2. 96) renders his injunction to Canterbury that the latter avoid ‘titles miscreate’ absurd, for if these titles are morally right then they are also already true. Henry decides the matter even as he poses the question.
‘awake our sleeping sword of war’ (22) and not to make ‘such waste in brief mortality’ (28) that would spill the ‘guiltless drops’ (25) of blood of both the English and French forces. Henry foregrounds his peace-loving character, morality, and good will as he proclaims the innocence of both the French and the English and recognizes the brevity and sacredness of a life that should tend toward virtuous ends. However, Henry’s performative use of modals undermines this carefully constructed ethos by calling into question his very prudence, virtue, and eunoia. Henry’s urging Canterbury to tell the truth — a virtuous warning in God’s name — immediately segues into his anticipation of a hypothetical war by way of rhetorical descriptio: ‘For God doth know how many now in health / Shall drop their blood in approbation / Of what your reverence shall incite us to’ (1.2.18-20). This brief descriptio, notable for the double presence of the modal verb ‘shall’, eerily colours Henry’s virtuous request or warning to Canterbury as a promise of war. Modality, defined as the speaker’s attitude toward the content of his utterance, is commonly expressed by verbs such as ‘will’, ‘shall’, ‘may’, ‘can’, or ‘must’ which can be either epistemic or deontic: epistemic modals express the speaker’s knowledge, belief, or opinion about a proposition, while deontic modals signal ‘the necessity or possibility of acts performed by morally responsible agents’.31 In other words, epistemic modality informs while deontic modality is performative; the latter bears traces of the speaker’s illocutionary intentions.32 Henry’s first modal verb ‘shall’ (19) is epistemic as well as predictive and suggests his belief that only God will know the consequences of the action that Canterbury will urge; only God will know ‘how many’ or how few will die and whether Canterbury’s urging is just or unjust.33 However, Henry’s second ‘shall’ in ‘Of what your reverence shall incite us to’ (20) bears a deontic modality that signifies an obligation or a promise, and indirectly underlines Henry’s intention to go to war. According to Leslie K. Arnovick, the Wallis rules, formulated by Bishop John Wallis in 1653 to teach native English speakers the proper usage of ‘will’ and ‘shall’ in future tense constructions, encode speaker modality or express ‘the speaker’s attitude of volition and expectation’ in interrogative or declarative sentences.34 The normative rules indicate that the verb ‘will’ in the first

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32 The sentence ‘John may come tomorrow’, for example, can have both epistemic and deontic modality: the speaker may be expressing belief in the possibility of John’s arrival (epistemic) or granting permission for John’s arrival (deontic).

33 Modality here overlaps with the future tense.

34 Leslie K. Arnovick, The Development of Future Constructions in English: the Pragmatics of Modal and Temporal ‘Will’ and ‘Shall’ in Middle English (New York: Peter Lang, 1990), p. 6. Arnovick deems that the Wallis paradigm teaches speakers ‘how to perform […] illocutionary acts’ with modal verbs ‘in certain declarative and interrogative sentences’ (p. 1). While the Wallis rules may seem anachronistic, Arnovick shows that they are historically grounded in late Middle English and early modern English utterances.
person and ‘shall’ in the second and third person (singular and plural) should be used to signify a threat, promise, or command; inversely, ‘shall’ in the first person and ‘will’ in the second and third person (singular and plural) should be used to signify prediction or expectation. Instead of using the predictive ‘will’ as his second modal verb, as prescribed by the Wallis rules, Henry uses the deontic ‘shall’ which suggests that he is either promising Canterbury that the latter’s counsel will be staunchly adhered to and that his counymen will be obliged to ‘drop their blood’ in war, or obliquely commanding Canterbury to urge war as he unfolds the prohibitive measures of the Salic Law. Henry thus gives his word to Canterbury that war will occur as a necessary consequence of what Canterbury commands, under the pretext of warning or asking Canterbury that war be avoided at all costs through the descriptio overseen by God. Regardless of whether Henry’s second ‘shall’ (20) is read as a promise or a command, the indeterminacy of his modal verbs suggests that he has already made his decision to invade France, despite the counsel he is about to receive from Canterbury.

The suspicion of Henry’s Machiavellianism, elicited by the deontic ‘shall’, is heightened by Henry’s potential complicity with Canterbury and Ely in 1.1. If Henry, as Canterbury hints, has accepted the bishops’ bribe to refrain from passing a parliamentary bill in exchange for their financial support for his war (1.1.73-82), then war is a foregone conclusion that makes Henry’s anti-war rhetoric seem a deceptive display for the purpose of promoting his ethos. Henry’s deontic ‘shall’ thus invites audiences or critics to infer that Henry’s logical reasoning is self-serving as he relegates the responsibility for war onto Canterbury in order to absolve himself of guilt and justify his inadvertently revealed goal to invade France.35 The unchristian logic underpinning Henry’s pragmatic use of modals, framed as it is by Henry’s possible complicity with the bishops, undermines the virtue, prudence, and good will that serve as pillars of his ethos as well as throwing a Machiavellian shadow over this ethos by showing that Henry’s intent to persuade his men against war belies his decision to wage war.

In a similar vein, the deontic modal verb ‘will’ in Henry’s promise to Canterbury that ‘we will hear, note, and believe in heart / That what you speak is in your conscience washed / As pure as sin with baptism’ (1.2.30-2) works with the analogy it introduces (‘As pure as sin with baptism’) to persuade Henry’s auditors of his ethos even as the

35 The recurrent strategy of foisting responsibility onto others so as to absolve himself of guilt is characteristic of Henry’s rhetoric throughout the play. See Bradley Greenburg, “O for a muse of fire”: *Henry V* and Plotted Self-Exculpation*, *Shakespeare Studies*, 36 (2008), 182-206 (p. 190).
modal verb and the analogy fracture this ethos by implying Henry’s political praxis. While Henry uses the modal ‘will’ in accordance with the Wallis rules to make a promise to Canterbury, this promise nevertheless fails to be a true promise because it flouts Searle’s preparatory condition, which both requires that the hearer wishes or ‘prefer[s] [the speaker’s] doing A to his not doing A’ (and the speaker is aware of this wish), and that the promise be made only if it is not obvious to the speaker and hearer that the speaker will do ‘A’ ‘in the normal course of events’. It is clearly not the case that Canterbury would prefer Henry to ‘believe in heart’ Canterbury’s pronouncement since the war with France, as the opening scene suggests (1.1.72-81), is inevitable and Canterbury has nothing to gain from this impending pronouncement. Moreover, given that Henry is the devout and prudent Christian king he claims to be, it would be obvious to both Henry and Canterbury that Henry will do ‘A’ (i.e. wisely heed the Archbishop’s counsel) ‘in the normal course of events’ without the need to make explicit his intention to do so. Rather than serving to assure Canterbury that he will heed his counsel, Henry’s superfluous ‘promise’ instead serves to flatter Canterbury by paying homage to his greatness for the purpose of indirectly buoying up Henry’s humility and eunoia. The analogy coupled with this ‘promise’ demolishes Henry’s image of piety and beneficence even as it is intended to shore it up, since the linguistic ambiguity of the analogy constitutes a fallacy that detracts from its argumentative weight. Although ‘as pure as sin with baptism’ refers to the sacrament of baptism — which is a nod toward Henry’s virtue and religiousness as it indicates Henry’s obligation to or recognition of Canterbury’s ethos, to which he appeals as a precondition for acting on Canterbury’s word — it misfires. Henry affirms that he will believe that Canterbury’s speech is a sober and direct reflection of his innermost thoughts, which are subservient to his conscience, and that his thoughts are cleansed (‘baptised’) by the dictates of moral wisdom. However, the contradiction in ‘as pure as sin’ gives rise to a deviant meaning to suggest that Henry may be urging Canterbury to make the case for a sinful war that

36 The comparison is an analogy rather than a simile because it is functionally argumentative. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca outline the argumentative structure of the analogy as follows: ‘A is to B as C is to D’ (p. 372). This is the four-term structure that Henry’s analogies follow, even though analogies can also be comprised of three terms (‘B is to A as C is to B’ or ‘A is to B as A is to C’; see The New Rhetoric, pp. 375, 376).


38 Aristotle identifies ambiguity in language as a ‘material’ fallacy which, according to Sister Miriam Joseph, ‘vitiates an argument which on the surface appears to be formally correct’; the ambiguity ‘may be in one word or in a conjunction of words’ (Shakespeare’s Use of the Arts of Language [New York: Hafner Publishing, 1966], pp. 367, 368). Joseph also notes that equivocation is a common material fallacy.
Henry (as his ‘conscience’) promises to authorize (‘baptise’); untruthful speech may become ‘good’ when justified and overseen by ‘conscience’. These discrepant meanings play off of the bifurcated connotations of conscience. As Camille Wells Slights reveals, conscience in the history plays is a locus where ‘internal self-awareness and external political action, the obligations of obedience and authority of personal judgment converge’. Thus, although Henry promises Canterbury that he will believe the matter of his speech since the Archbishop obeys a transcendent moral authority (God) that is incarnated in his personal conscience, Henry may also be insinuating that Canterbury should follow the dictates of a personal judgment that owes allegiance to Henry, rather than to God, as the supreme ruler and ‘conscience’ of the commonweal. The analogy, employed by Henry to persuade his interlocutors of his Christian ethos, is undermined by its argumentative force which substitutes God’s authority for Henry’s and thus countermands rather than reinforces the persuasive efficacy of Henry’s ethos. Serving as a silent behest to Canterbury, Henry’s promise strengthens the impression of a Machiavellian deviousness that resembles Ely’s and Canterbury’s.

Henry’s second analogy further undercuts the direct statements with which he builds his ethos to suggest his Machiavellian cruelty and aggression. The sudden appearance of the French ambassador in his court prompts Henry to urge him to divulge the Dauphin’s message. Henry uses an analogy to highlight his Christian clemency, temperance, and self-restraint so as to persuade the ambassador to deliver his news plainly and frankly (1.2.244) without the fear of incurring Henry’s wrath: ‘[w]e are no tyrant, but a Christian king, / Unto whose grace our passion is as subject / As are our wretches fettered in our prisons’ (1.2.241-3). While making his ‘passions’ subservient to his ‘grace’ may be virtuous, the vehicle of Henry’s analogy (‘our wretches fettered in our prisons’) underlines the action of a tyrant who is anything but temperate and benign. In comparing his passions to ‘wretches’ who are fettered in the ‘prisons’ of his grace, Henry ironically presupposes an equivalence between his subjection of the wretches and his ability to control his passions, but the comparison between ‘prison’ and ‘grace’ fails for grace denotes ‘favourable or benignant regard or its manifestation [. . .] favour or goodwill’ as well as ‘pardon or forgiveness’. Grace thus does not ‘fetter’ but liberates; Henry’s illiberal grace, however, contradicts this spiritual conception of grace as divine favour to reveal his equivocation. The illocutionary force of his analogy hence overturns rather than complements Henry’s constative statement that he is a merciful and benevolent Christian king by revealing instead his tyrannous exercise of power to

expediently justify a rule which lacks divinely sanctioned authority. This illogical coupling between tenor and vehicle destabilizes Henry’s self-proclaimed eunoria and undoes his attempt to persuade the ambassador by accentuating his power, to which all must submit if he is to ‘win’ his right. The irony in Henry’s analogy is only heightened by Canterbury’s praise of Henry in the opening scene, which further compounds the impression that a Machiavellian undercurrent of force and violence belies his character. Commending Henry’s political savvy, Canterbury boasts to Ely that Henry is superior to Alexander the Great: ‘Turn him to any cause of policy, / The Gordian knot of it he will unloose, / Familiar as his garter’ (1.1.45-7). Notwithstanding that Canterbury’s allusion to the Gordian knot may be intended to emphasize the superiority of Henry’s skill in undoing the knot that Alexander could not and hence, as Judith Mossman notes, showcase Henry as ‘morally superior’ to Alexander, the allusion also inadvertently implies Henry’s craftiness and ruthlessness as a ruler by associating him with the proverbially cruel Alexander who, as Janet M. Spencer explains, either violently cuts through the Gordian knot or cunningly removes the shaft around the knot.41 The physical violence latent in Canterbury’s allusion — which is further reinforced by the vow explicitly made by Henry following the ambassador’s departure to either ‘bend [France] to our awe, / Or break it all to pieces’ (1.2.224-5) — underscores Henry’s aggression and desire for domination, which make his claim that he is not a ‘tyrant’ highly ironic and his Christian clemency questionable.

In spite of the discrepancy between his ethos and his logos, Henry nevertheless succeeds in persuading Scrope, Cambridge, and Grey of his Christian ethos as he accuses them of treason. Henry’s use of biblical allusion and his continued use of analogy in his speech to his three lords (2.2.76-141) indirectly reassert his ethos as a divinely anointed sovereign and serve to convince the three lords of his piety, even as the series of logical fallacies following his speech ironically dismantle his image as a pious monarch. Since Henry is already acquainted with the lords’ plot to overthrow him, as Gloucester indicates (2.2.6-7), the goal of his speech is not to urge the lords’ confession but to impel them to admire his devoutness as a divinely anointed monarch and to thereby incite repentance; Henry’s speech successfully achieves both the

41 Judith Mossman, ‘Henry V and Plutarch’s Alexander’, Shakespeare Quarterly, 45.1 (1994), 57-73 (p. 61); Janet M. Spencer, ‘Princes, Pirates, and Pigs: Criminalizing Wars of Conquest in Henry V’, Shakespeare Quarterly, 47.2 (1996), 160-77 (p. 169). Mossman recognizes that the comparison between Alexander and Henry ‘has the potential for equal polyvalency’ (p. 63), while Spencer explains that Canterbury ‘suppresses the guile of the one version [of the Gordian knot episode] and the violence of the other’ (p. 169) through his gloss on ‘unloose’. Erasmus’s erotema seems uncannily pointed at Henry: ‘You have allied yourself with Christ—and yet will you slide back into the ways of Julius [Caesar] and Alexander the Great?’ (p. 153).
Illocutionary force of condemnation and the complementary perlocutionary effect of moving the lords to pitifully repent for their crime (2.2.147-8, 156, 161). Henry presents himself to his lords as an honest Christian king who embodies *eunoia* and *arete*. In underlining his disbelief of Scrope’s betrayal by asking him a rhetorical question (‘May it be possible that foreign hire / Could out of thee extract one spark of evil / That might annoy my finger?’ [2.2.97-9]) and confessing his incomprehension of the betrayal (‘’Tis so strange / That though the truth of it stands off as gross / As black on white, my eye will scarcely see it’ [2.2.99-101]), Henry foregrounds the degree of his faith and the extent of his trust in Scrope’s ‘white’ character, the virtue and purity of which metaphorically blind Henry to the ‘black’ news of treason that sullies it. Henry’s use of anaphora in ‘Thou that didst bear the key of all my counsels, / That knew’st the very bottom of my soul, / That almost mightst ha’ coined me into gold’ (93-5) moreover serves to highlight his astonishment and his difficulty or unwillingness in coming to terms with the crime. The foregoing rhetorical strategies all underscore Henry’s benevolence or good will toward his men, whom he has taken into his bosom and for whose sins he promises to ‘weep’ (137). Henry additionally reinforces his *arete* by a biblical analogy comparing his three fallen lords to prelapsarian Adams (138-9). Akin to his other analogies, Henry’s biblical analogy carries argumentative weight: it is an enthymeme proclaiming that the lords are fallen Adams because they were tempted and deceived by a ‘cunning fiend’ (108) to commit a crime. In attributing the cause of treason to temptation rather than to any ill will on the lords’ part, Henry’s analogy attenuates the severity of the lords’ crime; his goodness appears to salvage the lords’ reputable characters and, by implication, makes their treason appear even more diabolical. In stressing his Christian virtue and good will, Henry aspires to rouse the lords’ shame and guilt as a way of eliciting their repentance.

In further reinforcing his virtue through *enargia*, or a vivid description of the hypothetical consequences of the lords’ temptation, Henry condemns the lords’ intention to deceive him even though it is he who, ironically, deceives them. The *enargia* instantiates Henry’s rhetorical strategy of ‘presence’ which, according to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, ‘make[s] present, by verbal magic […], what is actually absent but what [one] considers important to [one’s] argument’.42 Henry succeeds in (re)creating the ‘presence’ of the biblical Fall by alluding to Tartarus, by personifying treason and murder as ‘two yoke-devils’ (103), and by employing direct dialogue on behalf of the devil-tempter so as to affectively overpower his hearers as he hints at their possible damnation:

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42 Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, p. 117. Presence is confidently used by Henry again in his speech at Harfleur to vividly describe the ravage he could cause in France (3.3.1-43).
Treason and murder ever kept together,
As two yoke-devils sworn to either’s purpose,
Working so grossly in a natural cause
That admiration did not whoop at them;
[...]
And whatsoever cunning fiend it was
That wrought upon thee so preposterously
Hath got the voice in hell for excellence.
And other devils that suggest by treasons
Do botch and bungle up damnation
With patches, colours, and with forms, being fetched
From glist’ring semblances of piety;
But he that tempered thee, bade thee stand up,
Gave thee no instance why thou shouldst do treason,
Unless to dub thee with the name of traitor.
If that same demon that hath gulled thee thus
Should with his lion gait walk the whole world,
He might return to vasty Tartar back
And tell the legions, ‘I can never win
A soul so easy as that Englishman’s’. (2.2.102-22)

Heralding the end of Henry’s use of presence, the anaphoric ‘Why so didst thou’ — which counterpoints Henry’s initial anaphora of disbelief (94-5) — is accusatory for the anaphora is tailgated by *epiplexis* or the enumeration of rhetorical questions that serve to condemn the extent of the lords’ infamy. Henry uses this anaphora to perform the illocutionary act of condemning the lords as he fashions himself as an authoritative judge carrying out the verdict of his men’s guilt:

Show men dutiful?
Why so didst thou. Seem they grave and learned?
Why so didst thou. Come they of noble family?
Why so didst thou. Seem they religious?
Why so didst thou (2.2.124-8)

 Epiplexis or *percontatio* are ‘accusations and reprehensions’ in which ‘one asks questions, not in order to know, but to chide or reprehend’ (Joseph, p. 256).
While the persistent repetition of ‘Why so didst thou’ registers the resoluteness and finality of Henry’s condemnation, his image as a righteous and God-like ruler who doles out Christian justice which is evoked by the anaphora is ironic since Henry is guilty of the same deceit of which he accuses his men. Not only does Henry denounce the lords for ‘hiding behind “semblances of piety”’ when he is guilty of the same in appealing to the covetous ecclesiastics for their political support (1.2), as Karl P. Wentersdorf has suggested, but he also deceives the lords prior to his speech when he dangles his pardon of a drunken man’s raillery in front of them to make them condemn themselves (2.2.76-80). In granting the lords the authority and the free will to indirectly accuse themselves by accusing the drunken man, Henry makes them responsible for their own fates, much in the same way that he grants Canterbury the authority to determine whether or not to wage war against France while holding him accountable for the course of action he counsels (1.2.21-3). Henry thus performs the role of devil tempter and undermines his rhetorical display of a virtuous, morally upright, and honest Christian king as he entraps the lords with their own logic by offering them a choice predicated on damnation as they unwittingly condemn the king’s pardon of the drunken man.

Henry not only implicates himself as a traitor in the very crime he condemns, but the logical fallacies succeeding this confrontation reveal a faulty logic that further destabilizes the God-like image he projects to his lords and feeds the speculation of his Machiavellian attitude. Once the lords depart, Henry attributes his success in unearthing treason to God and reckons that this success foreshadows the successful outcome of the war for the English:

We doubt not of a fair and lucky war,
Since God so graciously hath brought to light
This dangerous treason lurking in our way
To hinder our beginnings. We doubt not now
But every rub is smoothèd on our way. (2.2.181-5)

This pronouncement instantiates Henry’s first fallacy of non causa pro causa (false cause): Henry identifies God as the cause of an event (God brings treason to light) without having previously demonstrated that God is the cause (God is never mentioned in his encounter with his lords) and merely appends Him at the end to justify his arete. Henry’s untruthful declaration may be categorized as a post-hoc inference fallacy,

which operates on the assumption that there is a direct, causal relationship between God (A) and the discovery of treason (C) simply because (A) occurs before (C). In attributing the discovery of, and thus the responsibility for, treason to God’s *a priori* existence and in removing himself as the efficient cause (B) or agent of God’s will, Henry makes the success of his recent rhetorical performance contingent on divine intervention. In doing so, Henry promulgates his Christian ethos by showing his auditors that his moral rectitude is premised on his obedience to God’s authority and that his actions — as legitimate king and divinely appointed heir to the English throne — are divinely sanctioned. Henry’s second fallacy is embedded in the claim that this recent discovery of treason guarantees a ‘fair and lucky war’ (181) for the English: because God has done X, he will also do Y. However, since the premise that God has exposed treason is not true, the conclusion (i.e. that the outcome of the war will be favourable for the English) is not necessarily true or certain. Both of Henry’s fallacies constitute the larger logical fallacy of *argumentum ad consequentiam*, in which the belief in something (God) leads to positive consequences, even though these consequences do not necessarily prove that God has brought treason to light. Although Henry attempts to logically convince his auditors of the justness of his war against France by appropriating God, his logical fallacies damage his ethos by undermining the moral authority with which Henry condemns and punishing his lords’ treason.

Juxtaposed against Henry’s rhetorically persuasive encounter with his three lords is his exchange with the soldiers Williams, Court, and Bates, which displays his failure to persuade his soldiers of the justness of his war: the logical fallacies that perforate Henry’s speech compromise the wisdom, goodness, and good will that uphold his ethos. Donning Erpingham’s cloak to disguise himself as a common soldier, Henry-as-soldier tries to indirectly buttress Henry-the-king’s ethos by arguing in the king’s name to persuade his three soldiers of the nobleness of the king’s war and to secure their loyalty. Henry-as-soldier, in effect, embodies the perlocutionary uptake of Henry-the-king’s speeches, which Henry intends for all of his soldiers to have: the obedience and allegiance to the king exhibited by Henry-as-soldier (‘Methinks I could not die anywhere so contented as in the King’s company’ [4.1.125-6]), along with his sympathetic understanding of the king (‘I think the King is but a man, as I am’).

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45 *Post hoc* fallacies posit a definite causation between two events where there may only be a ‘positive correlation’ between them (Douglas Walton, *Informal Logic: A Pragmatic Approach* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008], p. 260).

46 Henry later, similarly, attributes the minimal loss of his men at Agincourt to God: ‘O God, thy arm was here, / And not to us, but to thy arm alone / Ascribe we all’ (4.8.106-8).
[4.1.101]), are intended to inspire Williams, Bates, and Court of the same. In order to fortify his soldiers’ belief in the king’s good will (eunoia) toward his men, Henry uses parallelism to persuade his hearers of the fundamentally shared humanness, via shared experiences, between soldier and monarch: ‘[t]he violet smells to him as it doth to me; the element shows to him as it doth to me’ (4.1.102-3). Although Henry-as-soldier claims comradeship with his men based on shared passions — the king’s fears ‘be of the same relish as ours are’ (4.1.109) — he quickly turns this comradeship into a prohibitive warning that ‘no man should possess [the king] with any appearance of fear, lest [the king], by showing it, should dishearten his army’ (4.1.110-12). The warning, a speech act that counsels the three soldiers to abstain from showing fear, unsettles the king’s ethos for it places responsibility for the king’s own potential fearfulness on his men. Formulated as an enthymeme, Henry-as-soldier’s persuasive argumentation would read as follows: A) The king is a man like his soldiers; B) The king’s fears are like those of his men; C) Therefore, no man should excite the king with fear. However, given that the conclusion (C) logically digresses from the two premises (A and B) by focusing on responsibility, Henry’s enthymeme falls into the fallacy of ignoratio elenchi (ignoring the issue) since his argument is ‘directed towards proving the wrong, or an irrelevant conclusion’.

Amending Henry’s logic, Bates’s retort produces a valid conclusion that logically follows from the premises: ‘[The king] may show what outward courage he will, but I believe, as cold a night as ’tis, he could wish himself in Thames up to the neck’ (113-15). In other words, if (A) the king is a man like his soldiers and (B) he shares their fear, then (C) the king would wish to be anywhere but on the battlefield. By turning Henry’s fallacy into a logically valid enthymeme, Bates exposes Henry’s sophistic logic which undermines the brotherhood and solidarity he rhetorically seeks to establish with his men; Bates highlights a social hierarchy between the king and his soldiers who, as the king’s subordinates, are to be used for the king’s benefit by inspiring him with courage and boosting his morale rather than vice-versa, as

47 For J. L. Austin, ‘uptake’ refers to the hearer’s ability to grasp the intended meaning behind the speaker’s utterance. While uptake is commonly used with reference to illocutionary utterances, I use it here to refer to the dutiful and patriotic sentiment expressed by Henry-as-soldier, which is an emotional effect that Henry-the-king fully intends his speech to have.

48 Unlike the syllogism, which explicitly contains a major premise, a minor premise, and a conclusion, the enthymeme usually implies a major or a minor premise. For an explanation of the rules governing the syllogism, see Joseph (pp. 356-57). Henry’s implicit premise is that all men are equal. Translated into a syllogism, Henry’s enthymeme would read: (A) All men are equal; (B) the king is a man, like his soldiers; (C) therefore if Henry’s soldiers are seized by fear, so is Henry.

49 Walton, p. 18.
the Chorus suggests. This revelation, along with the audience’s awareness of Henry’s disguise, renders Henry’s initial claim that ‘the King is but a man, as I am’ (4.1.101) ironic for the speaker is clearly not the man he pretends to be since his disguise compromises his rhetorical ethos by erasing the authority vested in the king’s visible presence. Although the Chorus describes Henry as a vigilant and Christ-like monarch who moves among his ‘ruined band’ (4.0.29) of ‘poor condemnéd English’ (4.0.22) to boost their morale before Agincourt (4.0.40-7), the Henry enacted on stage is much more reminiscent of the scheming Hal and invites the inference that his impersonation may be self-serving.

Just as Bates pinpoints Henry’s fallacious reasoning, the exchange between Williams and Henry-as-soldier magnifies how Henry’s logical fallacies undercut his own credibility. Henry, claiming that the king’s ‘cause’ is ‘just and his quarrel honourable’ (4.1.127), subsequently fails to logically support his own argument or even address Williams’s thesis. Although Williams and Bates sagaciously respond that it is impossible to know the king’s motives and whether the war is just or not (4.1.128-30), Williams tells Henry that the king, to whom his soldiers owe their allegiance and their duty, has a moral obligation to ensure that his soldiers ‘die well’ (143); Williams insinuates that the king, as Christian monarch, is answerable to a higher moral authority to which he owes allegiance and that the king’s will should work in accordance with the Divine Will to ensure his clear conscience. Williams further raises the possibility that the war is not ‘just’ since the means of war (the soldiers’ inevitable deaths) cannot justify its ends (the hypothetically successful outcome of the war), and thus implicitly questions the very justice of a war which does not allow men to die virtuously (139-42). Rather than proceed to logically prove his claim that his war is indeed just, Henry’s response instead registers the fallacy of ignoratio elenchi (ignoring the issue) through the misuse of analogy. Comparing the king and his men both to a father and his merchant son (146-9) and to a master and his servant (149-53), Henry claims that his soldiers are obliged to perform their duties like the son and the servant, but the tenor and the vehicle in the twinned analogies fail to correspond: the son and the servant are not sent on errands where the chances of their deaths are highly probable, and the king’s relationship to his soldiers — unlike that between a father and his son — is not based on

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50 The Chorus suggests that Henry wanders among his band of crestfallen men before Agincourt to thaw their ‘cold fear’ (4.0.45) and boost their morale with ‘cheerful semblance and sweet majesty, / That every wretch, pining and pale before, / Beholding him, plucks comfort from his looks’ (4.0.40-2).

51 Eric Pudney even suggests that Henry is beset by a ‘lack of faith in [his] followers’ and spies on his men ‘to get a better idea of [their] morale [...]’, since they will speak more freely in front of him if they do not know who he is’ (‘Mendacity and Kingship in Shakespeare’s Henry V and Richard III’, European Journal of English Studies, 19.2 [2015], 163–75 [p. 168]).
a blood bond. In comparing the king to both a father and a master, which is evocative of Erasmus’s distinction between a tyrant (a ‘cruel master’) and a Christian prince (a ‘conscientious father’), Henry puts the father’s Christian self-sacrifice on a par with the master’s politic selfishness in a manner that intimates his Machiavellianism. Not only does Henry’s incongruous comparison between soldiers and sons/servants make death in war seem accidental instead of highly probable, but it also highlights that soldiers have free will and implies that they, rather than the king, are responsible for their sinful or sinless actions: ‘The King is not bound to answer the particular endings of his soldiers, the father of his son, nor the master of his servant; for they purpose not their deaths when they propose their services’ (154-7). The tenuous comparisons drawn by Henry’s analogy serve to minimize his responsibility for the war and manifest a self-interested Machiavellian attitude that detracts from the selflessness he projects. Henry’s illogical analogy thus sidesteps the critical question of the justness of his war and delivers an argument for personal responsibility. Henry’s reasoning can be expressed as a logically valid but unsound syllogism: If the king (A) is a man (B), and all men (B) are responsible for their own souls (C), then the king (A) is also responsible only for his own soul (C). Because Henry applies the general premise that all men are responsible for their own souls to himself in particular — without considering the difference in social roles between king and commoner — he is guilty of the dicto simpliciter fallacy (sweeping generalization). Downplaying the mutual obligation between a monarch and his subjects, the fallacy exposes Henry’s attempt to absolve himself from moral responsibility as he highlights his soldiers’ personal duty toward their own souls (175-8) where it is public duty (as Williams observes) that is evidently at issue in the debate.

Since Henry’s ignoratio elenchi fallacy impedes him from refuting Williams’s point and proving his own thesis that the king’s cause is ‘just and his quarrel honourable’ (127), he instead attempts to prove that war itself is just since it provides punishment, in the form of death, for criminals who have ‘defeated the law and outrun native punishment’ (164-5). In proclaiming that war is God’s ‘beadle’ (166-7) or means of punishment,

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52 Erasmus compares the ideal ruler to a ‘father’ of the state (p. 152): ‘There is the same difference between a prince and a tyrant as there is between a conscientious father and a cruel master. The former is ready and willing to give even his life for his children; the latter thinks of nothing else than his own gain, or indulges his caprices to his own taste, with no thought to the welfare of his subjects’ (p. 161).

53 A king’s subjects are required to remain loyal to him just as the king is obliged to protect his subjects and be a ‘good and careful prince’ (Erasmus, p. 180). Henry, to borrow Erasmus’s words, neglects his duty ‘to consider the welfare of his people, even at the cost of his own life if need be’ (Erasmus, p. 149).

54 Walton specifies that the speaker’s ‘primary obligation’ in persuasion is ‘to prove his thesis which is supposed to be at issue in the dialogue’ (p. 18).

55 Henry further avers that should the criminals survive, war would still be just for it would allow them to recognize the workings of God and ‘prepare’ for their ultimate deaths (4.1.181-4).
Henry once again lays responsibility on God and His laws to prove that God’s vengeance is divinely sanctioned. By making war an agent of God’s retributive justice and effectively ignoring his own agency, Henry expounds to Williams, Bates, and Court the morality of war in order to justify his decision to wage it. Appropriating morality as an after-thought rather than showing it to be a guiding cause of his actions in a manner that echoes his encounter with Scrope, Cambridge, and Grey, Henry is once again guilty of committing the *argumentum ad consequentiam* fallacy: he establishes a causal connection between war and virtue in suggesting that the end result of war (death) deductively proves that war is a means of good. In making war a standard-bearer for justice, Henry dodges the claim that death in war is unjust by substituting in its place the question of his soldiers’ personal virtue. Henry’s logical fallacies, which frustrate his attempt to persuade his three soldiers that his war is just or to disprove Williams’s claim that the king is morally responsible for his men’s lives, demolish his prudence (*phronesis*) and tarnish the credibility needed to sustain his ethos as a just, kind-hearted, and devout Christian ruler.

While Henry certainly is the ‘mirror of all Christian kings’ (2.0.6), as the patriotic Chorus emphatically claims, he is not a paragon but merely the imitative copy of a Christian sovereign who, in lacking the divinely sanctioned right to rule, must ‘work’ to win his right. Henry’s rhetorical performances, constantly gesturing toward a legitimacy he does not possess, achieve their authority through their ability to persuade his audience of his ethos as a pious, humble, merciful, honest, and wise Christian monarch even as the imperfect logic of his rhetoric undermines this ethos by betraying his intention to invade France in order to legitimate his right; Henry’s rhetoric inadvertently exposes his illegitimacy even as he proclaims his legitimacy. Even so, Henry is not a Machiavel inherently for it is his rhetorical performances that create the impression of his Machiavellianism. The friction between Henry’s logos — evidenced in his use of modal verbs, faulty analogies, and fallacies — which argumentatively conveys his political expediency, and his constative utterances — which form the *arete, eunoia*, and *phronesis* of his rhetorically-crafted ethos — throws into relief a Machiavellian wiliness that discredits his Christian self-presentation and renders him morally dubious. A pragma-rhetorical reading of Henry’s speeches and verbal exchanges with his ecclesiastics, lords, and soldiers reveals that Henry’s notorious moral ambiguity is not intrinsic to his character but is instead a linguistic effect created by the failure of his logos to coalesce with his ethos in persuasive argumentation. Henry, as a result, is neither a Machiavellian politician nor a Christian king but, foremost, a formidable orator who rhetorically employs both discourses to persuade his audience and achieve his legitimacy as a king. In making Henry’s speech a site where Christian humanist
values converge with the political audacity animating his rhetoric, Shakespeare demonstrates that the ‘rabbit’ and the ‘duck’ are both endemic to Henry as an orator.