The Art of Memory Meets the Art of Government in *Hamlet*

Katherine Blake
Indiana University – Purdue University Indianapolis
katblake@umail.iu.edu

*Hamlet* is Shakespeare’s most sustained engagement with the place of remembering in English culture. It is not just Hamlet’s memories, but specifically the way he describes the process and experience of remembering, that make his remarks especially notable to early modern memory studies. Furthermore, it is no surprise that scholars often place Hamlet himself at the center of inquiry into the play’s memory discourse, since the Prince leads the most iconic ‘memorial’ scenes in the play such as the initial encounter with the Ghost. However, other characters reflect on memory as well. Though Claudius says less on the subject, he still has the privilege of introducing the play’s discussion of memory:

> Though yet of Hamlet our dear brother’s death
> The memory be green, and that it us befitted

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To bear our hearts in grief and our whole kingdom
To be contracted in one brow of woe,
Yet so far hath discretion fought with nature
That we with wisest sorrow think on him,
Together with remembrance of ourselves. (H, 1.2.1-7)²

For Hamlet, the Ghost’s injunction to ‘Remember [him]’ at least appears to assign a fairly straightforward prerogative to Hamlet’s memories. For Claudius, though, the word ‘remembrance’ is more obviously fraught with conflicting meanings: he compounds the act of remembering – specifically associated with grief – with a vision of duty and social responsibility, of ‘remembering oneself’ in the sense of maintaining composure. Expanded knowledge about the body and about medicine facilitates new significations for memory and the memory arts.³ Garrett Sullivan observes that fantasies of control in early modern beliefs about memory create a world in which, ‘forgetfulness is often imagined less as purely cognitive than as a bodily disposition, a mode of action, or a way of living.’⁴ Sullivan’s call to regard memory discourse as ‘less purely cognitive’ and to explore the embodiment of a ‘disciplined’ memory would also seem to invite studies of the historical contours of ‘discipline’ in a broader sense, as well as in relation to memory discourse. Indeed, the contrast between Claudius and Hamlet in Shakespeare’s play offers a window on the intersection of memory, discipline, and politics in Jacobean England.

One the one hand, the view of memory espoused here is typical of Claudius, the figure who exemplifies sovereignty as a political strategy unhinged from divine appointment. Claudius represents kingship as governance. He excels at forming alliances, at manipulating the conventions of appointment, and at rewarding those who have brought

him to power to ensure they will keep him there. This view of memory, then, is entirely consistent with a character who is ever in search of outward markers of his sovereign authority. Memory allows him to cite his outward comportment as a sign of some invisible, interior marker of sovereignty.

Hamlet, on the other hand, seems to take a different tack. While he, too, conflates ‘duty’ with remembrance and recollection, memory for Hamlet looks more like an internalized collection of etchings and ‘tables’:

Remember thee?
Ay, thou poor ghost, while memory holds a seat
In this distracted globe. Remember thee?
Yea, from the table of my memory
I’ll wipe away all trivial fond records,
All saws of books, all forms, all pressures past
That youth and observation copied there,
And thy commandment all alone shall live
Within the book and volume of my brain,
Unmix’d with baser matter. Yes, by heaven!
O most pernicious woman!
O villain, villain, smiling damned villain!
My tables. Meet it is I set it down,
That one may smile, and smile, and be a villain –
At least I’m sure it may be so in Denmark. [Writes] (H 1.5.95-109)

Hamlet regards remembrance in the classical sense of an ordered, disciplined mind that holds important forms of knowledge within immediate grasp. For Aysha Pollnitz, this scene depicts Hamlet trying to cast off his education, but to little avail. Pollnitz observes, ‘Hamlet proposes that to rid Denmark of Claudius and avenge his father, he

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5 Claudius manages and rewards figures like Polonius and Laertes in order to ensure their loyalty. This is not to say he is a good governor in every respect, but rather (as I will show) exemplifies certain qualities of a governor. Significantly, he may have a poor grasp of wartime politics. We see this demonstrated even in his first speech, when he describes what he will do about Fortinbras: ‘we have here writ / To Norway, uncle of young Fortinbras, – / Who, impotent and bed-ridden, scarcely hears / Of this his nephew’s purpose, – to suppress/ His further gait herein’ (H 1.2.27-31). A person so weakened is an unlikely force to suppress this type of threat. To rely on diplomacy is typical for Claudius’ style of leadership. As Machiavelli writes, ‘A prince... must not have any other object nor any other thought, nor must he adopt anything as his art but war, its institutions, and its discipline... The most important reason why you lose is by neglecting this art’. Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Prince*, trans. by Peter Bondanella (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 50.
must turn from philosophy to the practices of the court’. This cascade of memory symbols indicates even more specifically a scholastic understanding of memory. Hamlet’s intellectual approach to memory involves subjecting the mind to external influences crafted to preserve important knowledge. Moreover, as Lina Wilder has pointed out, the failure of Hamlet’s memory in this moment is significant: ‘The substance of Hamlet’s vow to remember reflects badly on his grasp of the principle of divisio. Rather than separating his vow to remember the Ghost from every other memorandum, Hamlet’s “tables” quickly become crowded with words that are not the Ghost’s.’ The limitations of Hamlet’s view memory are further illuminated by their contrast with Claudius’ words.

What we find in Hamlet’s antiquated vision of memory and Claudius’ notion of self-control are two related but nevertheless distinct conceptions of memory: Hamlet’s speech invokes the medieval ideal of order based in the practice of ars memoria, whereas Claudius treats memory as a marker of Foucauldian discipline in the sense that his view emphasizes ‘optimization’. In the former case, discipline staunches the flow of forgetting. In the latter, discipline is regarded as a way to improve individual’s participation in society or in the commonwealth. This form of discipline relies on technologies for surveying individuals and populations, and uses the information it gathers to proscribe behaviors that promote economic and social productivity. In the former case, a disciplined memory is one free of error, sin, and disease. In the latter case, a disciplined mind is one that contributes productively to the economy and to the commonwealth in general. While there can be no clean division between these two disciplinary modes, what we see in Hamlet, and in the period in general, are the contradictions and tensions that arise when forms of discipline meant to free the mind of sin are turned, instead, to the task of raising the productivity of the individual.

7 Elizabeth Hanson makes a strong case for the centrality of the University to our understanding of Hamlet’s character: ‘Scholarliness is present in the play both as an object of rather precise representation and as an ethos in which the audience is invited to participate’; see Elizabeth Hanson, ‘Fellow Students: Hamlet, Horatio, and the Early Modern University’, Shakespeare Quarterly, 62 (2011), 205-99 (p. 226).
8 Wilder, p. 112.
9 While it would be an mischaracterization to suggest that medieval monks who practiced ars memoria had no ambitions to strengthen the monastic institution through their efforts, the reason to emphasize the ‘collective’ in this particular shift is to understand the role that memory plays in shifting broader cultural associations with ‘discipline’ from a set of practices that purge undesirable characteristics to ones that promote desirable or productive traits. Though at no point was this shift anywhere perfectly accomplished, it is nevertheless useful to be able to note that, as early as the beginning of the seventeenth
This distinction is clearest in light of how these two characters describe bodies: For
Hamlet, the body ought to play almost no role in memory, while the mind is abstracted
into a tool for divining truth and aligned with other objects of knowledge like books.
For Claudius, the secret of memory lies in reading the body for signs of sovereign
authority. Wilder draws an intriguing connection between Hamlet’s view of memory
and primogeniture: ‘table-books... conflate writing and memory with the female body:
both receive the male pen; both perpetuate the male line’.\textsuperscript{10} Indeed, in the ordered
universe in which medieval \textit{ars memoria} operated, both hierarchy and primogeniture are
part of the great chain of being and powerful symbols of stability. We might further ask
whether such distinctions in these models of memory are part and parcel with the
politics of sovereignty within the play.\textsuperscript{11} \textit{Hamlet} has often been read in close connection
with scholarly work on the art of memory, but often to the exclusion of a discussion of
governance. Though Jonathan Baldo’s \textit{Memory in Shakespeare’s Histories: Stages of
Forgetting in Early Modern England} and Isabel Karremann’s \textit{The Drama of Memory in
Shakespeare’s History Plays} make important strides towards understanding the
imminence of politics in Shakespeare’s representation of memory, more could be done
to consider whether the role of memory in Shakespeare’s politics and vice versa.\textsuperscript{12}
Indeed, \textit{Hamlet} imagines a vital role for memory discourse at a time when sovereigns
faced increasing pressure to conceptualize their authority in terms of governance.

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{10} Wilder, p. 110.
\textsuperscript{11} As Anthony DiMatteo observes in his essay on \textit{Hamlet}, ‘Shakespeare’s audiences are repeatedly
invited to place questions of sovereignty and dominion within a conflicting framework of natural, civil
and divine allegiances. His works show that social and cosmic powers, from below and beyond the
monarch’s place in the human world, actively constrain the prerogative of princes.... Shakespeare
diversely calls into question the ‘dominus’ principle of early modern western society, that is, the
assumption - and the acting upon it - that one is entitled through birth and/or merit to have dominion over
the lives of people. This principle, along with the will to power and instrumental reason it requires, is
subject to natural and social forces of mutability and metamorphosis. These innovative processes are
beyond church and state’s control, much less any sovereign’s, with Plutarch, Livy, Ovid, Holinshed and
the Bible providing Shakespeare innumerable examples’. Anthony DiMatteo, ‘Shakespeare and the Public
http://go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?p=LitRC&sw=w&u=iuclassb&v=2.1&it=r&id=GALE%7CA123936099
&asid=3f61b9ba688725cb7f2921ad4e00578b [accessed 30 March 2017]. For me, such conflicts manifest
in \textit{Hamlet} through the competing views of memory presented by both Hamlet and Claudius. DiMatteo
also discusses King James’ approach to sovereignty in the context of \textit{Hamlet}, which is useful to consider
alongside my analysis below.
\textsuperscript{12} Jonathan Baldo, \textit{Memory in Shakespeare’s Histories: Stages of Forgetting in Early Modern England}
(London: Routledge, 2012). Isabel Karremann, \textit{The Drama of Memory in Shakespeare’s History Plays}
\end{quote}
Through Claudius, Shakespeare’s play represents governance appropriating the language of memory in order to create a model of sovereignty that satisfies a social desire for cohesion previously met by divine right.

Recovering the tensions between Hamlet and Claudius’ models of memory (and of sovereignty) offers something significant to recent studies of memory in Shakespeare. What *Hamlet* performs is not a broadly construed ‘early modern’ model of memory, but rather competing models of memory, a representation reflective of Shakespeare’s actual historical moment. Far from being a time when the memory arts dominated and repressed other forms of memory discourse, early modern thinkers in fact acknowledged and responded to rapidly evolving technologies of and ideas about memory. The polysemic nature of ‘remembrance’ and the increasing centrality of memory to institutions such as family, marriage, and even death rituals lead to the proliferation not of ‘memory’ as a monolithic idea but rather as a term that increasingly housed various, sometimes contradictory, meanings. Through opportunistic invocations of remembrance, characters in *Hamlet* reveal the strange political life of the nebulous concept.  

The kingly art of memory

And because examples move much, I will remember you, what some Kings of old thought of the weight of a Diademe.

For you must remember that there are two sorts of tyrants, the one by usurpation, the other by their form of government, or rather misgovernment.

*James I and VI from Paterne of a Kings Inauguration* (1620)

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13 In a book that does not, but could have had, a chapter on *Hamlet*, Jonathan Baldo analyzes memory in order to ‘focus... attention more directly on the sense of historical rupture and the experience of trauma associated with the ongoing process of the Protestant Reformation and on a shift in the way the plays construe English political identity: from medieval dynastic realm to early modern nation.’ Jonathan Baldo, *Memory in Shakespeare’s Histories: Stages of Forgetting in Early Modern England* (London: Routledge, 2012), p. 6.

14 James VI and I. *A Meditation Vpon the 27, 28, 29, Verses of the Xxvii. Chapter of St. Matthew. Or a Paterne for a Kings Inauguration.* (London: John Bill, Printer to the King, 1620), A2r.

15 Ibid., A7v-r.
In his *Paterne of a Kings Inauguration*, James reflects on his own approach to sovereignty by recording his insights into kingly responsibilities and duties, with emphasis on the important role that memory plays in shaping a just and good king. His discussions of memory reveal something profound about new attitudes towards monarchy, even as it is yet another conceptualization of the family as a framework for the state. His remarks on tyranny suggest how important good governance had become, particularly to the extent that memory figures heavily in this fiction of kingship. For instance, James suggests that if one can remember that the Greek words for ‘crown’ and ‘people’ are similar, then ‘it will serve for a good remembrance to a king; for the diademe or croune must put him in minde how he raignes by the love & acknowledgement of his people.’\(^{16}\) It revisits all of the old themes of monarchy – bodies, families, discipline, God, and hierarchy – but they are arranged according to the logic of remembrance – of *ars memoria* particularly – rather than patrimony. While this text is explicitly concerned with the preservation of dynasty, it not only takes the form of the inheritance of the second body, but also the legacy of the example set by Christ and other kings. Here, remembrance reinvigorates dynasty by opening a path to the art of governance. As an address from father to son, it powerfully assumes and advocates for primogeniture as the *de facto* mode of kingship, and yet despite this relies crucially on the rhetoric of governance. To this extent, it enacts the very singular displacement of primogeniture by governance in early modern politics, and in *Hamlet* as well. While the text seeks to preserve the line, the historicizing reader nevertheless feels strongly that primogeniture has been somewhat demoted, as though divine right alone is no longer sufficient to justify a form of sovereignty that lacks a theory of governance. The work that memory does here is to create a bridge between primogeniture (the ‘pattern’ and a history of kingship) and governance (the proper performance of sovereignty).

This text properly belongs in the canon that Foucault dubbed the ‘art of government’, an ancient approach to sovereignty that attempts to conceptualize and describe what is necessary to maintain rule and what, exactly, sovereign authority is.\(^{17}\) The art of government is a precursor for but fundamentally differs from the science of government or ‘governmentality’, a collection of strategies and institutions for managing large, diverse populations by imposing (through internalization) knowledge about what constitutes disorder and abnormality. Though *The Prince* is the most well-known example of the Renaissance art of government, Foucault argues that Machiavelli represents a view ‘from which people sought to distance themselves. [because it] was

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\(^{16}\) James, p. 40.

characterized by one principle: ... The prince acquires his principality by inheritance or conquest, but in any case he does not form part of it, he remains external to it.\textsuperscript{18} In England, Thomas Elyot published \textit{The Book Named the Governor} in 1531, which Foucault associates with other ‘implicit critiques’ of Machiavelli.\textsuperscript{19} His text envisions sovereignty as an extension of the commonwealth, and primarily as an ordering force for that governing body.\textsuperscript{20} In Elyot, the king is sovereign, but not necessarily external: He is the unifying head of a political system containing many bodies.

In addition to this type of historical contextualization, we might also think about how early modern attitudes towards memory can help to make sense of the \textit{Paterne}. The art of memory, like the art of governance, had been around for a long time, but enjoyed new prominence during the Renaissance. As Frances Yates’ influential \textit{Art of Memory} first discussed at length in 1966, the group of practices collectively known as \textit{ars memoria} emerged as a companion art to classical rhetoric, largely to meet the basic needs of the persuasive orator. Rhetoricians relied on the knowledge stored within the mind to spontaneously produce persuasive speech. According to Quintillian, speaking extemore was the \textit{sine-qua-non} of oratory.\textsuperscript{21} But such a view of memory held right up until the Renaissance, at which point concerns about the proper management of memory begin to come to the fore of the discourse. As William Engel points out, ‘Humanist educators, like Erasmus and Mulcaster... looked back, with high hopes, to Cicero for a model of order that would minimize the effects of the fragility of memory... Whole systems and regimes of thought were thus developed to keep one’s memory active and to keep forgetfulness at bay.’\textsuperscript{22} The new business of memory was far more administrative – concerned with observing and managing forgetfulness – than it had been in the past.

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\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., p. 89-90.
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., p. 89.
\textsuperscript{20} Elyot stresses governance in his discussion of the relationship between king and commonwealth: ‘Like as to a castle or fortress sufficeth one owner or sovereign, and where any more be of like power and authority seldom cometh the work to perfection... In semblable wise doth a public weal that hath more chief governors than one.’ Sir Thomas Elyot, \textit{The Book Named the Governor}, ed. by S. E. Lehmburg (Dent and London: Everyman’s Library, 1962), p. 6.
\end{flushright}
Grant Williams points out that the model of digestion forms an important bridge between anatomy and the art of rhetoric (including *ars memoria*). Such connections have been drawn and used to reflect broadly on the period’s values. However, such studies have sometimes incorrectly approached these humoral discussions from the assumption of repression. Critics who have argued that bodily control was a vital part of early modern *ars memoria* have also tended to associate early modern attitudes towards the remembering body through a framework of ‘anxiety’. In this model, forgetting is overly regulated because it is universally feared.

Mary Carruther’s *The Book of Memory* has been a widely influential study of memory in the medieval era; her premise is that medieval people largely did not share Plato’s reservations about writing as a threat to memory. Instead, she shows how books and writing were the primary vehicles through which memory’s operations were conceptualized. She dedicates many pages to humors, the body, undisciplined minds, and sin, making it clear that medieval people had specific reservations about the power of memory and the threat of forgetting. But the overwhelming impression that her work creates is not of a technology built to punish the wayward mind, but rather as means of self-edification and self-improvement. To quote from an article that takes up the question of *ars memoria* and literature through a discussion of poets,

> The real power of the mnemonic structure is not as a device for repetition (rote), but as a collecting and recollecting mechanism with which to construct one’s own education, and ‘be able to build onto his structure whatever he afterwards.

23 Grant Williams, ‘Textual Crudities in Robert Burton’s *Anatomy of Melancholy* and Thomas Browne’s *Pseudodoxia Epidemica*’, in *Forgetting in Early Modern English Literature and Culture: Lethe’s Legacies*, ed. by Grant Williams and Christopher Ivic (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), pp. 67-82 (p. 70). Williams references Thomas Wilson’s *The Art of Rhetoric* (1553), which refers to the practice of the memory arts as ‘digestion’, and belongs in the same canon as Fulwood (discussed below and in the body). In addition to these two texts, there is also John Willis’ *Mnemonica*, which is more strictly concerned with the practice of rote memorization in general. He devotes only a partial section to the care of the body in the third volume where he does address the ‘debilitated’ memory and its causes. See John Willis, *Mnemonica, or, the Art of Memory Drained out of the Pure Fountains of Art & Nature, Digested into Three Books: Also a Physical Treatise of Cherishing Natural Memory, Diligently Collected out of Divers Learned Mens Writings* (London: Leonard Sowersby, 1661), p. 157.

24 See also John Sutton, ‘Body, Mind, Order.’

finds’ in the ‘great sea of books and... the manifold intricacies of opinions’ that one will encounter throughout one’s life.26

Carruthers overwhelmingly seeks to represent medieval memory discourse as productive and inventive. The spirit of that reading can be carried into the early modern period to emphasize abundant examples of the power of memory as a creative force.

Such creative visions exist alongside, but at times emerge as distinct from, visions of repressive control of the body and mind. The type of discourse that Claudius exemplifies still relates to discipline, but by different means. The optimization of bodies through discipline is also a form of social control, and though it is not rooted in repression, it is not less violent than repression. Discipline, à la Foucault, is a means to enhance and exploit bodies and minds in order to produce obedient and productive subjects. In England, a popular memory treatise, published in the sixteenth century by William Fulwood and titled the Castel of Memorie, joined aspects of medieval ars memoria with medicine to explain to essentially ‘average’ Englishmen how to care for their memories so that they can be better businessmen, merchants, administrators, etc.27 This treatise along with John Willis’ Mnemonica are the two most important source-texts for early modern approaches to memory in England. Fulwood’s text is a translation from the work of an Italian doctor, and the vast majority of the text discusses medical treatments for the memory, while only the last few pages are dedicated to the idea of the ‘Memory castle’. The title, of Fulwood’s own design, indicates that despite the mostly medical content, he expected that a wider appeal came from these exciting ideas about memory palaces and theaters. However, it would be a mistake to place too much value on ars memoria in terms of what effect and purpose this text had. Its ethics were not strictly in line with that of medieval meditatio or hermetics, but rather with emerging ideas about how one should treat oneself; we might say, how best to govern oneself.

Fulwood’s text deals with all the bodily minutiae of memory that, according to him, will vastly improve the lives of his readers: ‘Thereof as concerning the meanes to cure it [the memory], first of all the feeding or kind of living must be altered according to the varietie of the causes, as we will hereafter show’, which he does, as one can imagine, in

27 I mean ‘men’ exclusively; Fulwood describes his audience as male, an important qualification for another article on early modern memory and culture.
immense detail. He not only painstakingly defines memory and its optimal environment, much of the book is dedicated to how to respond to and manage said environment: what to eat, what not to eat, when not to eat, where to eat, what temperature it needs to be outside, what phase of the moon, and so on. The extent to which the body is brought under the direct control of the individual is remarkable, as is the careful balance of different disciplinary behaviors, and all for the purpose of contributing to the economy, which is expressed in the translator’s note:

Amongst other there be twoo several causes (good Reader) which instigated me to enterprise and publish the translation hereof. Partely, because of mine own exercise and commoditie. But chiefly and especially, for the commoditie, utilitie, and profite of my native country. The advancement and benefit whereof every man is bounde both by nature and conscience to studye for, by al means possible to the uttermost of his power.

Fulwood was a successful merchant writing a text for other men (specifically). To that end, he places a person’s relationship to economy at the center of his text. Even the language of reproduction that he uses to describe invigorating the memory – ‘encrease’ and ‘fructifie’ – reflects the way in which an interiority is posited and then directed towards an exterior social realm. The body is at once the site of the individual and the place where the individual’s relationship to society is best read.

What Foucault says about governance in politics is directly reflected in the premise of Fulwood’s text. He begins by using the metaphor of a ship to explain governance:

What does it mean to govern a ship? It means clearly to take charge of the sailors, but also of the boat and its cargo; to take care of a ship means also to reckon with winds, rocks and storms; and it consists in that activity of establishing a relation between the sailors who are to be taken care of and the ship which is to be taken care of, and the cargo which is to be brought safely to port, and all those eventualities like winds, rocks, storms and so on; this is what characterizes the government of a ship.

29 Ibid., pp. 6-7.
Like governing a ship or a family, management of memory does not simply mean attending to one or two elements: one is required to perform a ballet of medical, physical, and mental tasks in order to function optimally as a member of society. Whereas ancient memory texts focused more explicitly on the conceptual labor involved in making memory, this work turns its gaze on the body and enlarging its capacities. It is no longer sufficient to build a memory palace; one must now groom the entire body – the palace grounds – in order to maintain the property. In this, the stamp of medieval memory discourse is undeniable: Memory requires constant vigilant watch on the part of the individual, and reinforces the authority of the text as well. Yet because such vigilance is certainly beyond what any normal person is capable of, it is only natural that one should seek help from books and experts in supervising their bodies. So while seeming to empower the individual with knowledge, it in fact draws them into a web of authority and knowledge-power.

Along these lines, it is also significant that rather than being driven solely by fears of an unruly mind, Fulwood’s text operates on promises of strengthening the memory as a way to improve one’s position in society. The proliferation of rules for regulation does not necessarily suggest widespread fear, but simply the new possibilities for managing memory, possibilities that are celebrated for their ability to transform normal individuals into *homo economicus*, that is, into beings whose purpose is to become productive and profitable members of society. This is not to say that there is no fear of memory or of forgetting in the text or the era, but simply that the desire to control memory need not necessarily correspond to anxieties about the absence of said control. That, indeed, an equally pernicious form of memory discourse arises from the belief that memory is the fertile site where self-edification collapses into economic achievement. While not wishing to push this observation into the realm of a general theory of early modern memory, it goes as far as helping us to recognize that *Hamlet*, too, need not be approach from the assumption that the art of memory is fundamentally about repressing dangerous elements, but rather that memory provides a path to a better self.

The play takes up some of this language of ‘humoral’ memory in a way that suggests that ‘unhealthy’ memories have a more complex place in the play than as the inverted sign of oppressive, hegemonic ‘memory’. The play’s most powerful indictment of ‘(un)healthy’ memory arrives in the midst of Ophelia’s madness, when she begins reciting ‘cures’ for certain physical ailments: ‘There’s rosemary, that’s for remembrance – pray you, love, remember. And there is pansies, that’s for thoughts’ (*H* 4.5.173-5). Such advice is like what one would find in a treatise on memory. Indeed, Laertes describes Ophelia as, ‘A document in madness: thoughts and remembrance fitted’ (*H* 4.5.176-7). Per the stage directions, Ophelia enters ‘distracted’, meaning not only mad,
but also torn apart from herself (H 4.5.25). Indeed, Ophelia herself is a testimony to the futility of this doctrine. She recites these cures in her madness, which suggests mockery rather than a studied representation of the principles. The knowledge that would supposedly treat her she already possesses to no avail. Putting this language of treatment into Ophelia’s mouth suggests a key difference between the causes of madness and the lack of discipline within the body. It does not merely demonstrate the futility of controlling memory, but the absurd confusion between the idealizations of self-control, on the one hand, and of health, on the other.

Ophelia’s predicament is anticipated even in Claudius’ first speech, wherein one finds this problem of embodied memory in Claudius’ description himself: ‘Yet so far hath discretion fought with nature / That we with wisest sorrow think on him, / Together with remembrance of ourselves’ (H 1.2.5-7). In ‘remembrance of ourselves’, Claudius implies that he has brought his body and mind under his own governance and eminent self-control. The phrase ‘wisest sorrow’ is particularly intriguing because La Perriere’s notion of ‘wisdom’ is the concept that Foucault underscores when he discusses the break from sovereignty as an end in itself:

Wisdom, understood no longer in the traditional sense as knowledge of divine and human laws, of justice and equality, but rather as the knowledge of things, of the objectives that can and should be attained, and the disposition of things required to reach them; it is this knowledge that is to constitute the wisdom of the sovereign.31

I do not wish to make too much of this kind of connection to La Perriere, except to note that the way Claudius’ means ‘wisest’ is underwritten by his demonstration of both mental and physical self-control. His ‘wisdom’ is his knowledge of self-discipline. He seeks to present that knowledge as evidence of his innate sovereign authority. Hence, at least where Claudius is concerned, memory is significant primarily as an object of control when it is a means to improve his claim to sovereign authority.

It is possible to trace the ‘optimization’ of memory throughout Hamlet, and particularly Claudius’ strategies for governing. Claudius’ governmental approach to authority gladly partakes of this new way of thinking about memory as a model for conditioning and maintaining orderly bodies. The play takes up a broad range of memory symbols, including writing and commonplacing, ars memoria and early modern memory treatises, drama and the art of acting, and also skulls and cemeteries. Although there is

no singular approach to memory that dominates the world of the play, when brought together, these different modes mark the transition from sovereignty based solely on externality and exception (represented best by Hamlet and the Ghost) to sovereignty based chiefly on the art of governance (represented by Claudius).

**Hamlet and the rhetoric of memory**

Claudius’ tangled discussion of memory and remembrance is notable coming from a usurper-king because these terms were already deeply implicated in notions of kingship based on divine right and primogeniture. Memory is, after all, conceptually imbricated in primogeniture, as James well knows; the child is often called the living memory and legacy of the father. This relationship is particularly explicit in *Hamlet*, where the Ghost’s demand that Hamlet kill Claudius (and presumably seize the throne) is expressed in the infamous utterance, ‘Remember me’ (*H* 1.5.91). But even this phrase reveals that remembrance is becoming unhinged from the traditional modes of legacy, standing instead for an imperative towards a course of proper action. Despite the fact that such remembrance appears to be the only path towards the preservation of primogeniture, it is explicitly divorced from the usual channels of inheritance. Linda Charnes observes the ‘political double-consciousness’ about succession issues from what she calls the play’s ‘strange paradox’, the eerie way that sense that, ‘everyone talks as if the throne were Hamlet’s birthright, yet no one questions why Claudius occupies it’.³² No doubt, some of this atmosphere is attributable to the Swiss mercenaries surrounding Claudius, another way that the power of ‘governance’ seems to assert itself in this play.³³ Regardless, primogeniture has clearly become unhinged, even as the language of memory persists beyond the apparent death of the prior social order. Claudius has not only usurped the throne, but also an important strategy for conceptualizing the transferal of kingly authority.

Claudius’ pursuit of an explanation for Hamlet’s madness demonstrates the power of reading the body for signs of disorder, a power that ultimately lies in the ability to create narratives. He laments to Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, ‘Of Hamlet’s transformation; so call it, / Sith nor the exterior nor the inward man / Resembles that it was’ (*H* 2.2.3-5). Though Claudius does not use the phrase here, early modern ‘self-forgetting’, defined

³³ There are further examples of Claudius’ approach to governance that, regrettably, cannot be covered here due to space, but which include interactions between Claudius and Laertes, whose filial obedience to his father’s memory Claudius channels and redirects. Similarly, when Fortinbras tries to reclaim the land his father lost, Claudius relies on diplomacy to prevent it.
by Sullivan, is clearly alluded to: ‘To forget... is to become dislodged from such a network, disengaged from that which determines your identity’. The lack of resemblance between his past and present self suggests that the old Hamlet has been lost or forgotten. In the end of this speech, Claudius speaks of a solution to Hamlet’s ‘transformation’, one that he will produce by surveying Hamlet through his two spies. By watching Hamlet’s behavior carefully, ‘To draw him on to pleasures, and to gather, / So much as from occasion you may glean, / Whether aught, to us unknown, afflicts him thus’, Claudius hopes they will discover the cause of what ails Hamlet (H 2.2.15-17). Unless he intends for Rosencrantz and Guildenstern to discover the murder, Claudius must hope that either Hamlet does not know about the crime or at least that he will not be believed. It seems more likely that Claudius’ panoptic gaze is turned on Hamlet in hopes that Claudius will discover some other narrative for Hamlet’s erratic behavior that does not threaten to reveal the murder. Claudius insinuates that no piece of information might be too small (‘So much as from occasion’). Coupled with the fact that Claudius may well fear he knows what ‘afflicts’ Hamlet, the usurper king is likely in search for any aberrant movement or thought that he might pin Hamlet’s entire demeanor to; in other words, he does not seek the truth, but a particular narrative that will allow him to frame Hamlet’s behavior.

Polonius not only understands Claudius’ strategy, he creates a laboratory from which to view observe Hamlet. He invokes madness to describe Hamlet’s problem:

Madam, I swear I use no art at all.
That he is mad, ’tis true; ’tis true ’tis pity;
And pity ’tis ’tis true. A foolish figure –
But farewell it, for I will use no art.
Mad let us grant him, then. And now remains
That we find out the cause of this effect,
Or rather say, the cause of this defect,
For this effect defective comes by cause:
Thus it remains, and the remainder thus. (H 2.2.96-104)

Through this matter of fact language of cause and effect (and cause and defect), Polonius sets out in search of one story that accounts for the greatest number of symptoms. By positing this straightforward connection between sign/effect and disease/cause, he does not make room for objective truth, but rather for a narrative that will make convincing, quasi-truthful bridges between these concepts. To this end, love

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34 Sullivan, p. 15.
is the most convincing explanation. As it turns out, this ‘false positive’ is particularly telling; because we know it is not true, the audience is invited to glimpse at the process by which symptoms are tracked and correlated to a particular cause, one which, while it may account for certain outward signs, is fundamentally flawed. Moreover, it is clear that such searching does not offer any solutions, but rather draws characters more deeply into a web of deception and surveillance.

Thus, Claudius’ sense of remembrance at the opening of the play is not an aberrant moment, but rather reflects his more general approach to narrating bodies and their behavior. The play attests to the power of such strategies, despite (or perhaps because of) their failure to speak to ‘truth’. Paul Ricoeur, in his masterful phenomenology of memory titled *Memory, History, Forgetting*, insisted that memory has an innate drive for ‘truth’ (despite its weaknesses), and set out to define ‘abuses’ of memory, which worked against this truth-seeking.  

Ricoeur argues that insofar as memory is ‘used’, it is not strictly cognitive, but also practical, and it can be ‘abused’. Further, this ‘abuse’ in fact underscores the vulnerability of memory even when it aims for truth. Claudius’ particular brand of ‘abuse’ adds some rich complexity to this paradigm. He does not abuse his or anyone else’s ‘memory’ so much as he harms the discourse of remembrance by exploiting the idea, eloquently expressed by Ricoeur, that memory yearns to be truthful. Claudius does not want ‘the truth’, per se, so much as to be seen as someone in search of said truth.

Such an understanding helps us to also reevaluate another important ‘mnemonic’ moment, the graveyard scene. In this discussion, the graveyard scene is important for two reasons; first, because it is there that the question of what bodies signify is most forcefully interrogated, and second, because it suggests that Hamlet may ultimately concede to the power of narrating origins, which is where the real potential of disciplinary techniques lies. The graveyard in *Hamlet* is the site of competing allegiances since, on the one hand, the bodies have symbolic meaning within the context of drama, but on the other hand, the materiality of the bodies is forcefully asserted:

> Alas, poor Yorick. I knew him, Horatio, a fellow of infinite jest, of most excellent fancy. He hath bore me on his back a thousand times, and now – how

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35 According to Ricoeur, ‘In what way, with respect to these stakes, are the vicissitudes of the exercise of memory likely to affect memory’s ambition to be truthful? In a word, the exercise of memory is its use; yet use includes the possibility of abuse.... It is from the angle of abuse that memory’s aim of truthfulness is seriously threatened’. Paul Ricoeur, *Memory, History, Forgetting*, trans. by Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), p. 57.
abhorred in my imagination it is. My gorge rises at it. Here hung those lips that I have kissed I know not how oft. Where be your gibes now, your gambols, your songs, your flashes of merriment, that were wont to set the table on a roar? Not one now, to mock your own grinning? (H 5.1.182-90)

Lina Wilder posits the question as to whether ‘it’, which sickens Hamlet, refers to the physical skull or the process of remembering. While Wilder’s point is if ‘memory is the belly of the mind, here, Hamlet’s uneasy stomach renders recollection as regurgitation’, one might well assert that the slippage of ‘it’ here is more urgent, especially if we consider the tension between the physical skull and its symbolism.

Indeed, Hamlet seems to represent a conflict between the skull’s singularity and the memento mori images from medieval society that were again becoming popular in early modern painting. The memento mori is a universal symbol of death, intimately rooted in a culture of ars memoria, but specifically one that foretells the death of the person viewing it. William Engel remarks that the memento mori symbol functions to ‘impel the viewer to reflect on the horrible appearance of death, and also to conceptualize and see beyond the even more horrible thought of ourselves as (being) nothing’. Because of its symbolic content, this skull undeniably foreshadows Hamlet’s death to the audience. But as Wilder points out, Yorick’s skull is ‘a physical revenant – not just a memento mori... The unexpected return of this figure from Hamlet’s past not only initiates Hamlet’s remembrance of Yorick but gives physical form to unwilled recollection.’ The play is heavy-handed about reminding audiences that there’s nothing special about discovering a skull in a cemetery. Medieval cemeteries were notoriously ridden with bodies, as Wilder notes, and which is made clear by the gravedigger picking up and tossing around skulls. This is actually in stark contrast to many famous early modern depictions of the symbol, because the memento mori in painting was increasingly de-contextualized, which is to say, removed from the obvious ‘places’ of death like the cemetery. Holbein’s ‘The Ambassadors’ (1533) is an archetypal example of the kind of de-contextualization and abstraction that the memento mori underwent in this period. The fact that Yorick’s skull is one among many suggests that what seems to be symbolically significant is also quotidian and unremarkable. Deconstruction has taught that signs do not have origins, but if they did, this scene

36 Wilder, p. 130.
37 Ibid., p. 130.
39 Wilder, p. 128.
40 Ibid., p. 128.
would successfully stage the encounter between the *memento mori* and its origin – the non-abstracted content the sign used to represent.

The symbolism of the *memento mori* was also deeply tied to those medieval beliefs about memory that were transforming into early modern beliefs about disciplined bodies. The skull is an outward sign that helps the person to maintain internal order. It reminded a person of his or her death and thus encouraged them to avoid sin and attend confession. Though the memory is part of this equation, it is not the sole object of it, so to speak; the goal is to work toward divine knowledge. Since caring for the memory means mastering all of the diverse variables that give rise to an array of conditions, it impels a reconsideration of a paradigm of ‘remembrance’ whose central image is a symbol that compounds the body without a soul and a skull without a brain. What ‘remains’ is the imperative, expressed in Hamlet’s epiphany, to turn away from reading mnemonics symbolically and towards acknowledging that objects have a history and an origin, and those things are that object’s reason for being, not the symbolic content. Significantly, it is this logic that Hamlet finally acknowledges in the graveyard scene. The skull does signify death, but the fact that it is Yorick’s skull, and that Hamlet ‘knew him’, suggests that the idea of the personal, embodied, idiosyncratic human memory is privileged over symbolism. This is not to say that there is no symbolic reading; rather, it is to say that the scene subordinates allegory and symbol to narrative and history; ‘remembering’ Yorick means looking beyond symbolism for an account of a thing’s meaning and history. The object encapsulates person and symbol at once; however, the oppressive entity behind the veil of this scene is discourse, and its sometimes-partner, narration. Memory not only provokes fears of decay and death, but it also exacts an imperative to question origins and identify causes. That the body is often at the center of such inquiry, and that such inquiry is ostensibly open to considering all causes equally, suggests this kind of discourse could both reflect and anticipate changes in, for example, paradigms of memory in natural philosophy, though political discourse will make such distinct use of these concepts that it demands a separate, yet complementary, reflection on politics.  

Despite the lingering of traditional models of monarchy in Hamlet and the Ghost, eventually, even divine right must acknowledge the mortal body as the primary

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41 In *Death and Drama*, Engel argues that a developing ‘aesthetic of decline’, designed to stave off mental decay, marks a significant early modern development in memory discourse. William Engel, *Death and Drama in Renaissance England: Shades of Memory*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). This, as well as Sutton’s account described above, offer explanations for why memory discourse in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries renews its focus on control of the body, but more could be said about the role of politics in this shift as well.
residence of humanity, but especially of kingliness. Hamlet asks Horatio, ‘Dost thou think Alexander looked o’ this fashion i’ th’ earth?’ (H 5.1.195-6). Horatio agrees that he did; Hamlet responds, ‘To what base uses we may return, Horatio! Why, may not imagination trace the noble dust of Alexander till he find it stopping a bung-hole?’ (H 5.1.200-3).

This notion – that the political significance of bodies is that they die and rot – is certainly an unexpected thought from an heir-apparent, but not if we consider that the idea of the King’s Two Bodies is no longer the most compelling theory of kingly embodiment. Be it through the sense that a sovereign must be open to counsel or must be shaped through proper education, kings are becoming governors of people and are no longer external and completely transcendent. But in this world, sovereignty is maintained through manipulation, surveillance, rhetoric, politics, discipline, and even murder; one kind of tyranny is merely exchanged for another, as Eric Nelson observes: ‘In Shakespeare’s darkly radical portrait of the political world, the only thing that seems to distinguish one regime from another is the relatively unglamorous matter of whose ambitions are served.’

The play’s take on this transition seems to be quite complex. On the one hand, we see the successful displacement of primogeniture by governance, at least for a time. On the other hand, it introduces new levels of tyranny through politics and the direct implication of bodies into the logic of sovereignty. By ending the family line, *Hamlet* drives home the sense that both perspectives are fundamentally flawed. Perhaps it even anticipates a revolutionary conclusion to monarchy. In that case, it is interesting to think about the arrival of Fortinbras, and particularly his claim to the kingdom by ‘rights of memory’ (H 5.2.396). Given the fraught conflations of memory discourses that we have witnessed, it is impossible to say what, exactly, a leadership based in ‘memory’ will portend for the kingdom. I would like to raise the possibility, however, that it signals a negotiation between divine right and governance, such as what James’ rule attempts to bring, seen especially in his *Paterne*. This approach will attempt to trade off both divine right and governance simultaneously, deploying memory as a medium for making exchanges and equivalences between these two modes of power (‘paterne’ both in the sense of physical copy and behavioral model). It is fascinating to think about how many languages that refer to the body like memory might potentially be doing this work of bridging old world power with new modes of biopower, and how much of this original meaning is still retained in later uses. This was certainly Foucault’s project, but he often failed to pinpoint exactly these sorts of moments, where power clearly sought to exploit

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the polysemic nature of certain concepts. Such moments, however, invite interesting questions about contrasting definitions of memory, the body, and politics.

The idea that the memory can be used to bring the body under control should come as no surprise to early modern scholars; however, the relative importance of this idea to the authorization of sovereignty does deserve special consideration. Claudius’ words expose the double-sided nature of ‘remembrance’ – as recollection and as duty – and in so doing, Claudius produces a hierarchy of ‘remembrance’, one in which self-discipline is placed above grief, and, by extension, above Hamlet’s claim to the throne. Since interpersonal court politics does not furnish the king with any notions of divine power the way that primogeniture and the king’s two bodies does, Claudius’ use of memory here is a way around this problem. It proposes that there is something internal and unique to Claudius that renders him a fit king. Memory discourse allows Claudius to posit an invisible interiority that sanctions his position, much like the second body would under the Doctrine. It preserves the sense that kingliness is embodied, even as it does away with the notion that it is inherited. It furnishes him with a ready-made notion of power and discipline that he marshals as evidence of his sovereign disposition, a political strategy that the court appears to tacitly support in their quiet acceptance of Claudius’ leadership.

Conclusion

The study of early modern memory wants for some unification amongst its various strands, including cognitive approaches, performance, and material history.43 On the one hand, these divisions partly reflect memory’s polysemic nature, and it is not always advisable to bring together – as Claudius does – notions of memory that are highly rhetorical and ultimately performative when we are seeking information about, for instance, the cognitive processes called ‘memory’. On the other hand, the future (and past) of early modern memory studies is no doubt cognitive to a large extent, and the

43 In Performing Early Modern Trauma from Shakespeare to Milton, Thomas P. Anderson links performance to historical and traumatic time through psychoanalysis, including several rich discussions of sovereignty and royal deaths. In his reading of Titus Andronicus, Anderson takes up the question of what happens when leaders make promises and projections that are rooted in invocations of a (traumatic) past: ‘Shakespeare’s criticism of the precedent narratives foundational to the Elizabethan culture shows us that the same instance of cultural obligation that resides in [Titus’] moment of promising can also result in a material violence that constitutes history’. Thomas P. Anderson, Performing Early Modern Trauma from Shakespeare to Milton (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), p. 45. See also the discussions of history and cognition in Hester Lees-Jeffries, Shakespeare and Memory, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
success of cognitive studies will hinge crucially on its ability to connect with and speak to other approaches, to qualify claims such as that

To focus on memory is to address the complex bridges between the embodied sensory-affective realm of individual experience and the social and material constituents of our activities of remembering... If no automatic priority can be granted to any single aspect of such hybrid ecologies of memory, the analytic challenge is to find techniques and tools to study the interaction between them all.44

The act of bringing together social position and personal or embodied experience is always potentially an expression of power.45 For this reason, the study of politics and power has the potential to enrich the field of cognitive literary studies. Much could be said about how Shakespeare charted the coevolution of politics and science, particularly in the history of mind and thought.

While cognitive historicism tends to privilege anatomical approaches to memory, it might do well to consider the rise of biopower and to analyze the politics of cognition itself. The recent crisis of reproducibility in psychology, for example, suggests that there is ample room for considering the difficulties that scientists themselves have had with circumventing their own identity politics in their research. Such problems are likely rooted in and shaped by the history of cognition. Beyond cognition, however, all approaches to memory would be enhanced by a consideration of memory’s deeply political history. Thinking about the politics of memory challenges many of our assumptions about how memory is embodied, be that through cognition, performance, or even collective memory. It comes down to how critics and theorists make decisions about what counts as memory, and what must be necessarily exiled. Recalling once again Ricoeur’s ‘abuses’ of memory, but in the context of biopower, raises further important questions about the entanglement of memory, history, and manipulation set up by Ricoeur. A biopolitical world is one in which truth itself is ambitious, and even

45 An important example of this is traumatic memory itself. As Meg Jensen has pointed out in her study of post-traumatic memory in fiction, traumatic memory is always a site where cognition meets knowledge-power: such projects ‘attempt to evoke what Gilmore calls, in an echo of Foucault’s four questions, ‘the opportunity to reflect on how knowledge about truth is produced, by whom and in what forms.’ Works of this kind... generate forms knowledge about the relations between truth, memory, and memorial’. Meg Jensen, ‘Post-Traumatic Memory Projects: Autobiographical Fiction and Counter-Monuments’, *Textual Practice*, 28 (2014), 701-25 (p. 707).
abusive. Though Claudius lies, his preferred strategy is to weave a tapestry of carefully selected truths and truisms, and ‘memory’ for him may well be little more than loyalty to his version of reality. To offer a modern example, when phrases like ‘Remember the Alamo’ becomes a figure of speech that makes a political statement and marks in-group status, we are no longer dealing with an abuse of memory so much as an abuse of memory’s cultural cachet. In that shift, ‘memory’ itself becomes dislodged from the discourse. Why this happens is beyond the scope of the present study. However, the example of Hamlet suggests that this is never a linear process. Memory can exit and reenter the conversation, so to speak, and each time it does, it has the potential both to reassert something like the truth and to invigorate dangerous metanarratives.

Suffice it to say, we understand surprisingly little about why or how memory and remembrance have evolved to acquire such powerful political connotations and implications, and why these aspects of the concept make themselves felt often more forcefully than the human, biological experiences with recollection. What we can be sure of, however, is that the more we start to engage with historical approaches to memory, the greater the pressure will be to understand the politics of memory so that we can better apply the scientific and medical discourses seeking to unravel its embodied mysteries.