



# Evaluation of the National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal

**Final report: Annexes**



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Neighbourhood Renewal  
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The findings and recommendations in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Department for Communities and Local Government.

Communities and Local Government  
Eland House  
Bressenden Place  
London  
SW1E 5DU  
Telephone: 0303 444 0000  
Website: [www.communities.gov.uk](http://www.communities.gov.uk)

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## Contents

<b>Glossary</b>		4
<b>Annex 1</b>	<b>Evaluation brief</b>	5
<b>Annex 2</b>	<b>NSNR - the nature of the Strategy and its implementation</b>	6
<b>Annex 3</b>	<b>NRF areas and allocations</b>	14
<b>Annex 4</b>	<b>PLASC data on population movements</b>	16
<b>Annex 5</b>	<b>Change in NSNR areas – narrowing the gap</b>	20
<b>Annex 6</b>	<b>Change in conditions for ethnic groups – use of proxies</b>	36
<b>Annex 7</b>	<b>NSNR Evaluation – follow up to review of 2006 NRF projects: report of survey on mainstreaming</b>	39

## Glossary

ABG	Area Based Grant
CEN	Community Empowerment Networks
CPA	Corporate Performance Assessment
CLG	Communities and Local Government
DAF	Deprived Area Fund
DWP	Department for Work and Pensions
FE	Further Education
GCSE	General Certificate in Secondary Education
GNVQ	General National Vocational Qualification
GVA	Gross Value Added
IB	Incapacity Benefit
IMD	Index of Multiple Deprivation
JCP	Jobcentre Plus
JSA	Job Seekers Allowance
KS	Key Stage
LAA	Local Area Agreement
LAD	Local authority district
LNRS	Local Neighbourhood Renewal Strategy
LPSA	Local Public Service Agreement
LRP	Local Research Project
LSOA	Lower Super Output Area
LSP	Local Strategic Partnership
NDC	New Deal for Communities
NMP	Neighbourhood Management Pathfinder
NSNR	National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal
NRF	Neighbourhood Renewal Fund
NRU	Neighbourhood Renewal Unit
ODPM	Office of the Deputy Prime Minister
PCT	Primary Care Trust
PLASC	Pupil Level Annual School Census
SDA	Severe Disablement Allowance
SDRC	Social Disadvantage Research Centre
SMR	Standardised Mortality Ratio
SSCF	Safer Stronger Communities Fund
SRB	Single Regeneration Budget
VAT	Value Added Tax
WNF	Working Neighbourhoods Fund

# Annex 1

## Evaluation brief

The aim of the evaluation was to provide evidence on the extent and the ways in which the NSNR has worked and to generate constructive and practical advice on how to improve the design and delivery of the Strategy. The evaluation is a strategy evaluation – it is not about assessing the individual components per se but about examining how they are working collectively.

The objectives of the evaluation were:

- (i) to show the nature and extent of NSNR impact and produce authoritative conclusions on the progress of NSNR in narrowing the gap
- (ii) to assess the design of the NSNR, both originally and as evolving, and provide pragmatic and constructive advice on possible ways in which it could be improved
- (iii) to assess the resources that underpin the NSNR, including Neighbourhood Renewal Fund (NRF) and draw conclusions on its sufficiency and value for money
- (iv) to report on how the NSNR has been implemented (at national, regional, local and neighbourhood levels) and uncover what approaches to neighbourhood renewal are working best and why, as well as identifying what is not working well or at all, and why that is the case; and
- (v) to consider the role and contribution of Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs) and Local Area Agreements (LAAs) in delivering the NSNR, including the use of NRF, contribution towards mainstreaming, and their planning and delivery activities (for example, Local Neighbourhood Renewal Strategies (LNRSS)).

# Annex 2

## NSNR – the nature of the Strategy and its implementation

### Introduction

The concentration of deprivation in certain neighbourhoods and the question of whether this exerts an additional negative impact on deprived people have been a long-standing concern. Since the 1960s successive governments have taken a number of initiatives to improve conditions in the most deprived areas, experimenting with economic and social initiatives as well as physical regeneration. At the same time there has been a continuing debate as to the extent of the importance of place – i.e. whether neighbourhood conditions have an additional or independent impact on people's life chances.

Despite the area-based initiatives taken over 40 years there remained in the late 1990s several thousand deprived neighbourhoods across England and tackling the problem became a priority of the Government elected in 1997. The NSNR was launched in January 2001.<sup>1</sup> It reflects a strategic approach focusing on the need to improve public services in deprived neighbourhoods throughout the whole of England and across all key areas (or domains) of government – work and enterprise, education, health, crime and the environment. It also emphasises the need:

- to enhance and focus mainstream service delivery
- for real community involvement in planning for and delivering the improvement of their areas; and
- for better co-ordination nationally, regionally and locally.

The factors that underpin neighbourhood change are complex. In seeking to address these, delivery of the strategy has entailed the development and use of a broad array of instruments and utilisation of a diverse infrastructure which have evolved over time. Key components have included:

- liaison and joint planning arrangements – nationally (between and within government departments and national agencies), regionally (e.g. integration of the neighbourhood renewal agenda through Government Offices) and locally (e.g. Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs) and Community Empowerment Networks (CENs))


<sup>1</sup> A New Commitment to Neighbourhood Renewal: National Strategy Action Plan [www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/cabinetoffice/social\\_exclusion\\_task\\_force/assets/publications\\_1997\\_to\\_2006/neighbourhood\\_action\\_plan.pdf](http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/cabinetoffice/social_exclusion_task_force/assets/publications_1997_to_2006/neighbourhood_action_plan.pdf)

- a framework of targets – including originally floor targets, national and local Public Service Agreements (PSA) Targets and more recently Local Area Agreements (LAA)
- finance and programmes including the Neighbourhood Renewal Fund (NRF) – subsequently replaced by Working Neighbourhoods Fund (WNF) – New Deal for Communities (NDC) and the Safer Stronger Communities Fund (SSCF)
- neighbourhood-based structures – including NDC, Neighbourhood Wardens and Neighbourhood Management Pathfinders; and
- information and support – including for example regional Skills and Knowledge action plans and associated actions; Neighbourhood Renewal Advisers; Residents Consultancies; renewal.net content; and Neighbourhood Renewal Unit's (NRU's) research programme.

## The NSNR delivery infrastructure

The Strategy has operated through a series of structures at a number of levels – national, regional, local and neighbourhood (see Figure 1.1). This framework depends on the operation of effective partnerships and a range of processes and tools designed to secure the necessary vertical and horizontal integration.

At national level, the Strategy is the responsibility of Communities and Local Government (CLG) – formerly the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM). In 2001 the Neighbourhood Renewal Unit (NRU) was created within ODPM to provide leadership and oversight of the National Strategy within Whitehall and outside. The Unit reported to the Minister of State for Regeneration and Regional Development, with a group of senior ministers, chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister (DPM), overseeing its work. In 2004 the NRU was incorporated within ODPM's Tackling Disadvantage Group, together with the Social Exclusion Unit and the Homelessness and Housing Support Unit. As a formal entity it was disbanded, but responsibility for neighbourhood renewal was retained within CLG and taken forward in the context of the Sub-National Review of Regeneration and Economic Development, with an increased focus on tackling underlying economic drivers of deprivation.

**Figure 1.1: The neighbourhood renewal delivery framework**

At regional level, the Government Office (GO) network was responsible for the development and implementation of local neighbourhood renewal strategies in their regions. They have acted as a source of support for LSPs and were responsible for administration of a number of renewal funds. The relationship of the GO to the LSP is a multi-faceted one; on the one hand the GO provides support and advice both directly and through the development of relationships with partners at regional level, on the other the GO has responsibility for the review and challenge of LSP performance.

The most innovative element of the delivery infrastructure was the creation of LSPs to bring together at local level different parts of the public sector as well as the private, business, voluntary and community sectors. While LSPs now exist in all local areas, their development was originally only a requirement in those areas that were in receipt of NRF. The development and delivery of local neighbourhood renewal strategies, with the assistance of NRF, was a key driver in those areas which are eligible for the funding. The agreement of the LSP subsequently became a condition for use of NRF funding. It can be argued therefore that their establishment was an early achievement of the Strategy. Local authorities were expected to play a central but not dominating role within the LSP. The LSP's core tasks included the introduction of statutory Community Strategies, the rationalisation and simplification of existing partnerships, the development and delivery of LNRs and the development of Local Public Service Agreements. They subsequently acquired responsibility for agreeing Local Area Agreements (LAAs).

Within the NSNR, the only formalised structures established at neighbourhood level have been for the delivery of specific programmes, in particular the NDC and the Neighbourhood Management Pathfinders. However, LSPs are expected to complement strategic activity with a focus on achieving impact at neighbourhood level through forms of neighbourhood management, i.e. the devolution of power to an individual, team or single neighbourhood organisation. This has taken a variety of forms with a common theme that the consultation and involvement of local communities should link closely to a neighbourhood management approach.

## Funding and spatial focus

In the eight years up to 2007-08, close to £5bn was allocated to activities and programmes directly funded within the NSNR. A summary of this funding is set out in Table 1.1.

The new money made available to support the Strategy comprised initially, for the most part, the NRF which was launched in 2001. This was seen as a top-up to local authorities, to help them to begin improving core services in the most deprived neighbourhoods. It was not ring-fenced, and was available for the LAs to spend flexibly on their own services and also on those of other providers.

The NRF was focused on, and limited to, the more deprived local authorities, as determined by the Indices of Multiple Deprivation (IMD). NRF was originally allocated across 88 local authority districts. Following a review, five of the original districts no longer received NRF as of 2005-06 and were replaced by three new areas. From 2008-09 NRF was reformed as Working Neighbourhoods Fund (WNF). The eligible areas were reduced to 66 – although the 20 other areas received two year allocations of transitional funding. The allocations are shown in Annex 3.

Table 1.1: NSNR funding						
	Neighbourhood Renewal Fund	Single Community Programme	Neighbourhood Management	Neighbourhood Wardens	New Deal for Communities	LEGI
<b>Coverage</b>	88 LADs, ave. pop. 250,000	88 LADs, ave. pop. 250,000	35 schemes, ave. pop. 10,000	245 Neighbourhoods, ave. pop. 6,000	39 Neighbourhoods, ave. pop. 10,000	25 areas
<b>1999-00</b>					£4.7m	
<b>2000-01</b>			£3.44m £3.43m	£5.35m £5.61m	£37.5m £33.5m	
<b>2001-02</b>	£198.86m <sup>2</sup>	£21.99m £9.35m	£10.14m £10.22m	£11.23m £11.91m	£82.2m £85.2m	
<b>2002-03</b>	£300.00m <sup>2</sup>	£31.00m £39.75m	£8.72m £9.00m	£20.08m £20.26m	£185.9m £176.3m	
<b>2003-04</b>	£399.99m <sup>2</sup>	£54.46m £44.16m	£12.00m £11.99m	£30.00m £30.00m	£252.7m £245.1m	

<sup>2</sup> NRF monies are allocated as part of the Local Government Grant settlement process and are therefore deemed to be spent.

Table 1.1: NSNR funding (continued)

	Neighbourhood Renewal Fund	Single Community Programme	Neighbourhood Management	Neighbourhood Wardens	New Deal for Communities	LEGI
<b>Coverage</b>	88 LADs, ave. pop. 250,000	88 LADs, ave. pop. 250,000	35 schemes, ave. pop. 10,000	245 Neighbourhoods, ave. pop. 6,000	39 Neighbourhoods, ave. pop. 10,000	25 areas
<b>2004-05</b>	£449.98m <sup>2</sup>	£43.41m £43.00m	£12.00m £19.89m	£19.00m £19.23m	£270m £281.9m	
		<b>Safer and Stronger Communities Fund</b>				
<b>2005-06</b>	£522.45m			£210m* minimum	£273m	
<b>2006-07</b>	£525.00m			£220m* minimum	£277m	£31.20m
<b>2007-08</b>	£525.00m			£230m* minimum	£250m	£91.48m
	<b>WNF</b>					
<b>2008-09</b>	>£450m			£52m		£103.17m
<b>2009-10</b>	>£500m			£31m		£98.89m
<b>2010-11</b>	>£500m			£5m		£93.95m
<b>Total</b>	<b>&gt;£4,371.28m</b>	<b>£150.85m £136.26m</b>	<b>£46.3m £53.35</b>	<b>£85.66m £87.29m</b>	<b>£1,628.3m £826.7m</b>	<b>£418.69m</b>
		<b>SSCF Total £748m minimum</b>				

Within the 88 districts, the LSPs were given the task of defining priority neighbourhoods in terms of electoral wards or other small areas of several thousand people, as a part of their drawing up LSNRs. Local circumstances were to guide this choice. Over 90 per cent of the LNRs have adopted some form of spatial targeting although the extent (or exclusiveness) of this has varied significantly – depending in part upon the degrees of deprivation across different areas in the local authority area.

LSPs were also asked to bear in mind issues that affected communities of interest, such as minority ethnic or faith communities, which might straddle an LSP area.

Whilst the NRF (and subsequently WNF) has been the biggest neighbourhood-focused funding stream within the Strategy there have been others with similar aims of influencing, improving and focusing the delivery of mainstream services. All these programmes focus on deprived neighbourhoods and, predictably, there has been a high degree of overlap:


- New Deal for Communities (1999-2009), foreshadowed the launch of the National Strategy. Its aim is to tackle deprivation in small neighbourhoods through boards of local service providers and community representatives. It focuses on 39 communities and has a total budget of c.£2bn
- Neighbourhood Wardens (2000-05), were introduced to tackle anti-social behaviour in small neighbourhoods, foster social inclusion and to reduce crime and the fear of crime. With a total budget of £91m it covered 245 neighbourhoods initially, with this number reducing by transfer to mainstream funding
- Neighbourhood Management Pathfinder Programme, intended to provide a model for neighbourhood level management in deprived communities, had provided £45m to 35 neighbourhoods from 2001-02 to 2004-05
- Single Community Programme (2001-05), with a budget of £150m over the four years aimed at building social cohesion through community activity and help the community and voluntary sector to participate in LSP decision-making in the 88 NRF areas
- Community Facilitation Programme was set up as a quick response to disturbances in northern towns in England in 2001 with an emphasis on providing conflict resolution expertise; and
- Skills and Knowledge Programme, set out in *The Learning Curve* strategy document in 2002, which aimed to improve the supply of relevant learning opportunities and provide incentives for bottom-up action in neighbourhood renewal areas. A number of innovative tools were developed, including Neighbourhood Renewal Advisers (NRAs), Regional Networks and [www.renewal.net](http://www.renewal.net).

The Local Enterprise Growth Initiative (LEGI) was introduced in 2006 with the aim of encouraging enterprise development in deprived areas. Following the first bidding round 10 areas (in 14 local authority districts) were selected and a second bidding round resulted in a further 10 areas (in 15 local authority districts) being added. The total budget for 2006 to 2011 is over £400m.

In 2006, the Neighbourhood Wardens, Neighbourhood Management Pathfinder Programme and the Single Community Fund were replaced by the Safer, Stronger Communities Fund (SSCF). There were two elements to the SSCF – the Neighbourhood Element, designed to help improve the quality of life and services in deprived neighbourhoods and the Safer, Greener, Cleaner Fund, which aimed to help create quality spaces.

Given the NSNR's 10-20 year time horizon, it has needed to respond to changing circumstances as well as embodying the long-term commitment that is essential if the deep-seated problems of disadvantaged areas – and critically the causes of those problems – are to be addressed. The key changes in the Strategy are summarised in Figure 1.2.

**Figure 1.2: NSNR milestones**



# Annex 3

## NRF areas and allocations

	2001–2008 (£m)		2001–2008 (£m)
Allerdale	4.491	Lincoln	2.100
Ashfield	5.059	Liverpool	167.667
Barking and Dagenham	10.289	Luton	6.417
Barnet	2.000	Manchester	169.616
Barnsley	34.026	Mansfield	14.154
Barrow-in-Furness	11.490	Middlesbrough	44.292
Birmingham	163.575	Newcastle-Upon-Tyne	44.524
Blackburn with Darwen	25.926	Newham	108.702
Blackpool	19.700	North East Lincolnshire	9.138
Bolsover	11.976	North Tyneside	18.288
Bolton	34.143	Norwich	3.927
Bradford	69.020	Nottingham	16.909
Brent	14.245	Oldham	29.861
Brighton and Hove	9.720	Pendle	10.295
Bristol	30.889	Penwith	5.524
Burnley	9.357	Plymouth	14.234
Camden	34.397	Portsmouth	4.066
Coventry	33.060	Preston	15.753
Croydon	4.470	Redcar and Cleveland	21,566
Derby	21.806	Rochdale	31.118
Derwentside	12.086	Rotherham	22.599
Doncaster	54.795	Salford	47.154
Dudley	9.879	Sandwell	65.640
Ealing	6.469	Sedgefield	6.865
Easington	36.147	Sefton	35.196
Enfield	11.065	Sheffield	62.161
Gateshead	29.526	South Tyneside	46.844

	2001–2008 (£m)		2001–2008 (£m)
Great Yarmouth	12.330	Southampton	3.663
Greenwich	31.647	Southwark	64.513
Hackney	95.929	St Helens	24.693
Halton	32.030	Stockton-on-Tees	23,757
Hammersmith and Fulham	6.391	Stoke-on-Trent	30.465
Haringey	44.059	Sunderland	45.265
Hartlepool	25.663	Tameside	10.729
Hastings	9.254	Tower Hamlets	86.620
Hyndburn	6.792	Wakefield	27.756
Islington	51.123	Walsall	42.376
Kensington and Chelsea	4.593	Waltham Forest	15.193
Kerrier	8.455	Wandsworth	1.700
Kingston upon Hull	65.064	Wansbeck	11.246
Kirklees	21.778	Wear Valley	13.912
Knowsley	60.262	Westminster	12.982
Lambeth	20.988	Wigan	20.453
Leeds	63.431	Wirral	35.956
Leicester	51.023	Wolverhampton	37.052
Lewisham	14.592		

# Annex 4

## PLASC data on population movements

The Pupil Level Annual School Census (PLASC) data can be used as an alternative to the 2001 Census to look at the movement of households over time. We have tracked the changes in the addresses of children between 2002 and 2005 for all LSOAs in England and for the three Key Stages, KS2 to KS4. Clearly, while PLASC has the advantage of providing more up-to-date information than the Census, it only records data for those families with children of school age<sup>3</sup> rather than the whole population. The data also includes migrants from abroad. Since the population base of the Census and PLASC differ one would not expect the two to show identical patterns. This may, in particular, affect gentrifier areas which have already been shown to have a disproportionately low percentage of households with children. Nevertheless, analysis of the PLASC data can provide a valuable supplement to test the robustness of the Census-based neighbourhood typology.

Table 1 shows the overall percentage of people in a neighbourhood type moving and the percentage that are moving from one neighbourhood to another neighbourhood of the same type. In both cases the data include all LSOAs: hence the 'other' category represents those LSOAs that do not fall within the 20 per cent most deprived.

<b>Table 1: Mobility and movers within same neighbourhood type, by Key Stage</b>			
	<b>All children</b>	<b>% movers</b>	<b>% movers within same neighbourhood type</b>
<b>KS2</b>			
Other	427,293	24.0	86.5
Escalator	26,134	28.9	12.3
Transit	50,404	29.4	19.2
Gentrifier	10,468	28.8	5.3
Isolate	45,765	28.8	36.2
<b>KS3</b>			
Other	428,706	21.9	86.2
Escalator	25,416	26.7	12.3
Transit	47,900	27.3	19.9
Gentrifier	9,799	26.6	5.3
Isolate	44,186	27.2	38.1

<sup>3</sup> Only households with children in the relevant Key Stage age group will be included. There will be some double-counting of households since a single household may have children in more than one Key Stage age group (or in the same Key Stage age group, if they had twins, for example).

**Table 1: Mobility and movers within same neighbourhood type, by Key Stage (continued)**

	All children	% movers	% movers within same neighbourhood type
<b>KS4</b>			
Other	431,842	18.3	85.1
Escalator	24,397	22.0	12.3
Transit	45,480	22.6	20.0
Gentrifier	9,513	21.6	5.4
Isolate	42,523	22.0	36.5

Note: Excludes Not Classified neighbourhoods

Table 2 looks similarly at the percentage of movers within the same neighbourhood type but distinguishes between those in NSNR and those in non-NSNR districts.

**Table 2: Mobility and movers within same neighbourhood type, by NRF/non-NRF district**

	All children	%movers	% movers within same neighbourhood type
<b>All</b>			
Other	1,287,841	21.4	86.0
Escalator	75,947	25.9	12.3
Transit	143,784	26.6	19.7
Gentrifier	29,780	25.8	5.3
Isolate	132,474	26.1	36.9
<b>NRF</b>			
Other	365,772	22.2	67.5
Escalator	64,317	23.7	14.2
Transit	85,159	24.3	22.4
Gentrifier	24,243	23.6	6.7
Isolate	123,411	24.4	41.5
<b>Non-NRF</b>			
Other	922,069	21.1	93.7
Escalator	11,630	37.9	5.5
Transit	58,625	29.8	16.5
Gentrifier	5,537	35.1	1.2
Isolate	9,063	48.7	5.9

Note: Excludes Not Classified neighbourhoods

Overall, there is little difference between the rates of mobility of households in different types of neighbourhood. The differences are more marked for non-NSNR areas, but here many of the neighbourhood types inevitably include relatively small numbers since few of the 20% most deprived LSOAs are in non-NSNR districts. The levels of mobility grow progressively lower through Key Stage 2 to Key Stage 4, and this is consistent for each of the neighbourhood types. This is reassuring, since all the empirical evidence shows that residential churn is highest for households where the head of the household is in the age range 20 to 30 and decreases among older age groups. One would therefore expect lower levels of mobility for households with children at later Key Stages.

The most encouraging finding is that the percentage of households moving from one neighbourhood type to the same neighbourhood type adds confidence to the logic of the typology based on Census data. By far the largest within-type moves are found in the 'other' category, suggesting that the least deprived households are able to stay outside the 20 per cent most deprived neighbourhoods.

Most interesting, however, is the fact that overall and within NSNR areas the highest percentage of within-type moves (within the 20 per cent most deprived areas) is found amongst Isolate areas: more than one-third of mobile households who lived in isolate areas in 2002 had moved to other isolate areas by 2005, and this pattern is consistent across all three Key Stages (Table 1). This is, however, not the case for non-NSNR areas. This could suggest that policy-related interventions in NSNR areas have encouraged households to stay in isolate neighbourhoods, but it is more likely to be explained by the geographical context of isolate areas. Since there are relatively few isolate neighbourhoods outside NSNR areas and since households generally move short distances, the probability of a household moving from one Isolate to another Isolate neighbourhood is inevitably lower outside NSNR areas. Geographical context is clearly fundamental.

At the other extreme, for neighbourhoods with low rates of within-type moves, the pattern of within-type moves in two of the other neighbourhood types also accords with the logic of the typology. As the typology would suggest, escalator areas and, in particular, gentrifier neighbourhoods both have very low percentages of within-type moves. In each case, the logic of the typology implies that most households in such neighbourhoods move on to other types of area (to better areas in the case of escalators, and to poorer areas for those displaced in the case of gentrifiers).

The numbers of each neighbourhood type are markedly different.<sup>4</sup> Hence, the raw percentages above might best be expressed in terms of the ratio of observed-to-expected moves, i.e. the ratio of actual moves compared to the number one might have expected had moves been on a random basis. These are shown in Table 3, where the expected percentages have been calculated in terms of the overall distribution of neighbourhood types across the country. The values above 1.00 show a greater number of moves than expected.

<sup>4</sup> There are 2519 Transit LSOA neighbourhoods, 2030 Isolates, 1213 Escalators, 521 Gentrifiers and 213 Not Classified. The remainder (being outside the 20 per cent most deprived) total 25,984.

<b>Table 3: Moves between neighbourhood types: actual to expected ratios</b>					
<b>From/To</b>	<b>other</b>	<b>escalator</b>	<b>transit</b>	<b>gentrifier</b>	<b>isolate</b>
Other	1.07	0.68	0.91	0.63	0.49
Escalator	0.58	3.29	1.89	2.77	3.19
Transit	0.76	2.07	2.54	2.12	1.19
Gentrifier	0.54	3.40	2.09	3.32	3.21
Isolate	0.43	3.52	1.21	2.76	5.91

Note: Excludes Not Classified neighbourhoods

Again, there are some useful confirmatory indications from the ratios, especially in relation to transit and isolate neighbourhoods:

- Moves from the 20 per cent most deprived neighbourhoods to the 'other' category are underrepresented. The highest ratio is from transit areas, which is what the typology would lead one to expect.
- Moves from 'other' areas into the 20 per cent deprived neighbourhoods are underrepresented; the one exception – which almost reaches a value of 1.0 – is to transit neighbourhoods, which again is what the typology would suggest.
- Most of the moves are within the same type of neighbourhood (i.e. along the diagonal of the matrix). Most interestingly, by far the largest ratio of within-type moves is for the isolate neighbourhoods, which adds further credence to the concept underlying the typology.

# Annex 5

## Change in NSNR areas – narrowing the gap

This annex provides the data to support the tables and figures in Chapter 3 of the evaluation report. In each case the relevant table or figure in Chapter 3 has been inserted in brackets.

### Definitions

#### (a) 'Most/least deprived'

In all cases the relative deprivation of areas has been defined according to their position on the Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD).

These tables refer to the rank of deprivation of LSOAs being either 'nationally-defined' or 'locally-defined'. The difference is that:

- nationally defined means those LSOAs that are the most deprived (according to the IMD) across England as a whole
- locally defined means those LSOAs that are the most deprived (according to the IMD) within each local authority district.

#### (b) Domain indicators

Worklessness is defined here as comprising the proportion of the total working age population in England in receipt of either unemployment or work-limiting illness allowances (i.e. Jobseeker's Allowance or Incapacity Benefit/Severe Disablement Allowance).

Key Stage 4 attainment (education) of young people aged 15-16 years is determined by assigning a volume indicator to each examination passed (i.e. 2 for vocational GCSEs, 1 for standard GCSEs and 0.5 for short course GCSEs) in addition to a points score on the basis of the quality of the grade achieved in each GCSE/GNVQ examination (e.g. A\* = 58 points, A = 52 points and B=46 points).

The Standardised Mortality Ratio (SMR) (health) is a measure of the number of deaths in an LSOA compared to the expected level given the area's age and gender structure. It is a relative measure and takes the age/sex standardised mortality rate of England to be 'average'; England therefore always has a score of 1. An SMR score greater than 1 should

be interpreted as indicating that the area has a higher than expected mortality rate, taking into account the age and sex profile of the area's population. An SMR score less than 1 should be interpreted as indicating that the area has a lower than expected mortality rate, taking into account the age and sex profile of the area's population.

The SMR is calculated for the under 75 population using data over a four year period to avoid distortion, given the small population at risk of death in any one year.

Crime figures are given as rankings of all 32,482 LSOAs across England (and are thus relative figures).

<b>Table 1: (Table 3.1) NSNR Local Authority Districts (LAD) total performance: Key indicator change since 2001</b>					
<b>Domain</b>	<b>Indicator</b>	<b>Absolute change – England</b>	<b>Absolute change – NRF LADs</b>	<b>Absolute change in England/ NRF gap</b>	<b>Narrowing the gap? (2001 gap =100)</b>
<b>Worklessness</b>	Worklessness	9.8% – 8.9%	13.5% – 11.8%	3.7% – 2.9%	97.0%
	JSA rate	2.5% – 2.1%	3.7% – 3.1%	1.2% – 1.0%	97.9%
	IB/SDA rate	7.3% – 6.7%	9.8% – 8.7%	2.5% – 2.0%	96.9%
<b>Employment and Enterprise</b>	Employment rate	75.1% – 74.5%	68.7% – 69.7%	-6.4% – -4.8%	75.0%
	VAT registrations (per 10,000 population)	37.8 – 38.8	34.1 – 34.8%	-3.7 – 4.0	108.1%
	Self-employment rate	11.8% – 12.7%	10.6% – 11.9%	-1.2% – -0.8%	66.7%
<b>Crime</b>	All crime	69.3 – 54.0	87.4 – 66.9	18.1 – 12.9	71.3%
	Violent crime (per 1,000 population)	11.3 – 17.6	15.2 – 21.8	3.9 – 4.2	107.7%
	Burglary (offences per 1,000 households)	18.8 – 12.8	25.4 – 16.1	6.6 – 3.3	50.0%

**Table 1: (Table 3.1) NSNR Local Authority Districts (LAD) total performance: Key indicator change since 2001<sup>5</sup> (continued)**

Domain	Indicator	Absolute change – England	Absolute change – NRF LADs	Absolute change in England/ NRF gap	Narrowing the gap? (2001 gap =100)
<b>Education</b>	GCSE (5 A*-C)	50.0% – 64.5%	40.6% – 61.8%	–9.4% – –2.7%	28.7%
	Key Stage 2 English	75.0% – 80.0%	71.3% – 77.8%	–3.7% – –2.2%	59.5%
	Key Stage 3 English	65.0% – 74.0%	58.5% – 69.6%	–6.5% – –4.4%	67.7%
	Key Stage 3 Maths	66.0% – 76.0%	59.4% – 71.9%	–6.6% – –4.1%	62.1%
<b>Health</b>	Standardised Illness Ratio (SIR)	1.000	1.353 – 1.333	0.353 – 0.333	94.3%
	Standardised Mortality Ratio (SMR)	1.000	1.180 – 1.187	0.180 – 0.187	103.9%
	Low Birth Weight	6.1% – 6.3%	7.0% – 7.1%	0.9% – 0.8%	88.9%
<b>Housing</b>	House prices	£129,763	£102,159	–£27,604	87.5%
		– £223,187	– £199,027	– –£24,160	
Worklessness rate		2001 – 2007			
JSA rate		2001 – 2007			
IB/SDA rate		2001 – 2007			
Employment rate		2001/02 – 2007/08w			
VAT registrations (per 10,000 population)		2001 – 2006			
Self-employment rate		2000/01 – 2005/06			
All crime		2003/04 – 2007/08			
Violent crime (per 1,000 population)		2000/01 – 2007/08			
Burglary (offences per 1,000 households)		2000/01 – 2007/08			
GCSE (5 A*-C)		2000/01 – 2006/07			
Key Stage 2 English		2000/01 – 2006/07			
Key Stage 3 English		2000/01 – 2006/07			
Key Stage 3 Maths		2000/01 – 2006/07			
Standardised Illness Ratio (SIR)		2001 – 2005			
Standardised Mortality Ratio (SMR) All Causes		1998/2001 – 2002/2005			
Low Birth Weight		1997/2001 – 2001/2005			
Housing		2001 – 2007			

Source: FTI/ SDRC, 2008

Table 2: (para 3.3.2) Variations in NSNR LAD gap narrowing performance

	Average regional change in gap between NRF LADs and national average											
	No.NRF LADs narrowing	No. NRF LADs constant	No. NRF LADs widening	East Midlands (2 LADs)	East Midlands (7 LADs)	London (20 LADs)	North East (14 LADs)	North West (21 LADs)	South East (4 LADs)	South West (4 LADs)	West Midlands (7 LADs)	Yorks. + Humber (9 LADs)
<b>Worklessness</b>												
JSA rate (%)	60	0	28	0.31	-0.27	0.09	-0.66	-0.10	0.16	-0.62	0.56	-0.30
IB/SDA rate (%)	57	0	31	0.52	-0.62	0.28	-1.11	-0.73	0.35	0.20	-0.15	-0.53
Low income rate (%)	63	0	25	0.33	-1.26	0.77	-1.83	-1.15	-0.44	-1.13	0.09	-1.23
<b>Employment and Enterprise</b>												
Employment rate (%)	58	2	28	-2.40	2.23	1.96	4.39	1.13	-0.58	0.92	-0.77	1.46
Self-employment rate (%)	34	1	36	-0.60	-0.47	1.81	-0.69	0.30	-0.73	0.20	-0.23	-0.22
<b>Crime</b>												
All crime	57	0	31	-1.70	-8.16	-7.74	-1.72	-5.81	1.02	2.03	-6.49	-6.82
Violent crime	48	0	40	1.80	3.17	-5.06	2.83	0.90	5.88	1.75	-5.21	5.81
Burglary	57	0	31	6.90	-4.87	1.57	-4.14	-6.30	-2.65	-2.65	-6.50	-7.20
<b>Education</b>												
GCSE (5 A*-C)	77	0	11	2.65	7.14	7.07	10.38	7.19	0.83	-1.35	5.80	6.34
Key Stage 2 (average points score)	39	1	48	-0.46	-0.01	-0.27	-0.01	0.13	-0.03	0.08	0.09	-0.02
Key Stage 3 (average points score)	51	0	37	0.09	0.87	0.97	0.12	-0.05	-0.56	-0.82	-0.15	-0.16

**Table 2: (para 3.3.2) Variations in NSNR LAD gap narrowing performance (continued)**

		Average regional change in gap between NRF LADs and national average											
		No. NRF LADs narrowing	No. NRF LADs constant	No. NRF LADs widening	East LADs (2 LADs)	East Midlands (7 LADs)	London (20 LADs)	North East (14 LADs)	North West (21 LADs)	South East (4 LADs)	South West (4 LADs)	West Midlands (7 LADs)	Yorks. + Humber (9 LADs)
<b>Health</b>													
Low birth weight (%)		54	0	27	0.30	-0.10	-0.20	-0.00	-0.00	0.00	-0.20	-0.20	-0.20
SMR		36	0	51	0.002	0.022	-0.001	0.000	0.012	0.030	0.005	0.023	-0.004
SIR		51	0	34	0.040	-0.034	0.048	-0.099	-0.052	0.025	0.016	0.023	-0.047
<b>Housing</b>													
Average house prices (£)		25	0	63	-9,123	-20,200	70,037	-21,679	-19,959	-3,436	20,378	-22,275	-14,134
Source: SDRC, 2008			Improving relative performance										Deteriorating relative performance

Table 3: (Fig 3.2(a)) Change in worklessness by LSOA decile, 2001-2007 – nationally defined									
IMD decile	Workless count* 2001	W/A population Est.** 2001	Worklessness rate 2001 (%)	Workless count* 2007	W/A population Est.** 2007	Worklessness rate 2007 (%)	Absolute change	Percentage change (%)	
1 (Most deprived)	707,220	2,975,274	23.8	667,198	3,211,749	20.8	-3.0	-12.6	
2	498,755	3,028,995	16.5	479,732	3,249,510	14.8	-1.7	-10.3	
3	392,590	3,068,304	12.8	376,964	3,254,208	11.6	-1.2	-9.5	
4	318,800	3,071,592	10.4	302,228	3,226,287	9.4	-1.0	-9.7	
5	264,420	3,052,659	8.7	249,922	3,189,462	7.8	-0.8	-9.5	
6	221,645	3,039,306	7.3	204,764	3,145,380	6.5	-0.8	-10.7	
7	190,260	3,047,976	6.2	174,264	3,135,414	5.6	-0.7	-11.0	
8	159,095	3,055,179	5.2	144,868	3,124,572	4.6	-0.6	-11.0	
9	133,740	3,056,544	4.4	121,633	3,127,233	3.9	-0.5	-11.1	
10 (Least deprived)	97,050	3,056,310	3.2	88,420	3,086,682	2.9	-0.3	-9.8	

Source: SDRC, 2008; IMD 2004

\* Workless count = claimants of JSA, IB/SDA

\*\* Working age population = females aged 16 – 59 years, and males aged 16 – 64 years

**Table 4: (Figure 3.2 (b)) Change in worklessness by NSNR LSOA decile, 2001 – 2007 – locally defined**

NRF local decile	Workless count* 2001	W/A population Est.** 2001	Worklessness rate 2001 (%)	Workless count 2007	W/A population Est. 2007	Worklessness rate 2007 (%)	Absolute change	Percentage change (%)
1 (Most deprived)	304,420	1,200,855	25.4	288,538	1,289,817	22.4	-3.0	-11.8
2	246,660	1,203,228	20.5	234,617	1,298,085	18.1	-2.4	-11.8
3	216,150	1,216,116	17.8	204,130	1,305,147	15.6	-2.1	-12.0
4	190,395	1,226,565	15.5	177,883	1,315,113	13.5	-2.0	-12.9
5	172,210	1,270,509	13.6	158,827	1,339,536	11.9	-1.7	-12.5
6	145,805	1,230,492	11.8	131,408	1,286,838	10.2	-1.6	-13.8
7	129,965	1,276,449	10.2	115,471	1,325,640	8.7	-1.5	-14.4
8	109,160	1,267,278	8.6	95,287	1,307,553	7.3	-1.3	-15.4
9	92,020	1,271,643	7.2	77,596	1,295,202	6.0	-1.2	-17.2
10 (Least deprived)	69,995	1,253,925	5.6	58,274	1,274,844	4.6	-1.0	-18.1

Source: SDRC, 2008; IMD 2004

**Table 5: (Figure 3.2(c)) Change in worklessness by non-NSNR LSOA decile, 2001-2007 – locally defined**

Non-NRF local decile	Workless count 2001	W/A population Est. 2001	Worklessness rate 2001 (%)	Workless count 2007	W/A population Est. 2007	Worklessness rate 2007 (%)	Absolute change	Percentage change (%)
1 (Most deprived)	252,630	1,725,018	14.6	260,499	1,850,646	14.1	-0.6	-3.9
2	190,800	1,773,684	10.8	192,124	1,881,324	10.2	-0.5	-5.1
3	158,195	1,776,666	8.9	157,661	1,876,575	8.4	-0.5	-5.6
4	138,700	1,817,532	7.6	135,193	1,895,502	7.1	-0.5	-6.5
5	126,280	1,874,037	6.7	119,494	1,951,494	6.1	-0.6	-9.1
6	105,660	1,770,666	6.0	98,926	1,821,798	5.4	-0.5	-9.0
7	99,725	1,836,924	5.4	92,213	1,885,656	4.9	-0.5	-9.9
8	88,235	1,792,446	4.9	80,563	1,826,901	4.4	-0.5	-10.4
9	80,810	1,853,646	4.4	72,353	1,884,297	3.8	-0.5	-11.9
10 (least deprived)	65,760	1,814,460	3.6	58,936	1,838,529	3.2	-0.4	-11.6

Source: SDRC, 2008; IMD 2004

**Table 6:(Figure 3.3(a)) Change in Key Stage 4 attainment by LSOA decile, 2002/03 – 2006/07 – nationally defined**

IMD decile	Average points score* – Key Stage 4 2002/03	Average points score – Key Stage 4 2006/07	Absolute change	Percentage change (%)
1 (Most deprived)	222.58	249.32	26.74	12.0
2	243.50	266.41	22.91	9.4
3	257.47	277.92	20.46	7.9
4	271.31	289.25	17.95	6.6
5	283.42	300.30	16.88	6.0
6	294.85	309.68	14.83	5.0
7	303.70	317.86	14.16	4.7
8	312.13	324.09	11.96	3.8
9	320.54	332.27	11.73	3.7
10 (Least deprived)	332.52	343.97	11.45	3.4

Source: Neighbourhood Statistics, 2009; IMD 2004

\* average Key Stage 4 best of 8 capped points score

**Table 7: (Figure 3.3(b)) Change in Key Stage 4 attainment by NSNR LSOA decile, 2002/03 – 2006/07 – locally defined**

NRF local decile	Average points score – Key Stage 4 2002/03	Average points score – Key Stage 4 2006/07	Absolute change	Percentage change (%)
1 (Most deprived)	217.98	244.82	26.84	12.3
2	230.97	257.35	26.38	11.4
3	240.62	265.95	25.33	10.5
4	249.30	273.89	24.59	9.9
5	261.67	285.13	23.46	9.0
6	272.63	293.99	21.35	7.8
7	282.84	304.61	21.76	7.7
8	293.80	314.90	21.10	7.2
9	305.97	324.26	18.28	6.0
10 (least deprived)	322.58	339.53	16.95	5.3

Source: Neighbourhood Statistics, 2009; IMD 2004

\* average Key Stage 4 best of 8 capped points score

**Table 8: (Figure 3.3(c) Change in Key Stage 4 attainment by non-NSNR LSOA decile, 2002/03 – 2006/07 – locally defined**

Non-NRF local decile	Average points score – Key Stage 4 2002/03	Average points score – Key Stage 4 2006/07	Absolute change	Percentage change (%)
1 (most deprived)	240.88	256.98	16.09	6.7
2	263.77	277.52	13.75	5.2
3	277.10	290.58	13.48	4.9
4	288.81	301.66	12.85	4.4
5	296.61	310.87	14.26	4.8
6	303.35	316.81	13.46	4.4
7	310.24	322.07	11.83	3.8
8	316.77	328.43	11.67	3.7
9	322.25	334.38	12.13	3.8
10 (least deprived)	331.82	343.80	11.99	3.6

Source: Neighbourhood Statistics, 2009; IMD 2004

**Table 9: (Figure 3.4) Change in SMR by LSOA decile, 1998/01 – 2002/05 – nationally defined**

IMD decile	SMR 1998/01	SMR 2002/05	Absolute change	Percentage change (%)
1 (Most deprived)	1.651	1.716	0.065	3.9
2	1.388	1.425	0.038	2.7
3	1.234	1.251	0.017	1.4
4	1.094	1.108	0.014	1.3
5	0.993	0.995	0.002	0.2
6	0.904	0.904	0.000	0.0
7	0.843	0.833	-0.009	-1.1
8	0.784	0.781	-0.003	-0.3
9	0.736	0.730	-0.006	-0.9
10 (least deprived)	0.655	0.653	-0.001	-0.2

Source: SDRC, 2008; IMD 2004

**Table 10: (Figure 3.4) Change in SMR by NSNR LSOA decile, 1998/01 – 2002/05 – locally defined**

NRF local decile	SMR 1998/01	SMR 2002/05	Absolute change	Percentage change (%)
1 (most deprived)	1.729	1.809	0.079	4.6
2	1.537	1.596	0.059	3.8
3	1.429	1.454	0.025	1.8
4	1.340	1.365	0.025	1.9
5	1.236	1.249	0.013	1.1
6	1.126	1.146	0.020	1.8
7	1.058	1.049	-0.010	-0.9
8	0.938	0.939	0.001	0.1
9	0.853	0.838	-0.016	-1.8
10 (least deprived)	0.741	0.727	-0.014	-1.9

Source: SDRC, 2008; IMD 2004

**Table 11: (Figure 3.5) Change in violent crime and burglary rankings by LSOA decile, 2000/01 – 2004/05 – nationally defined**

IMD decile	Violent crime rank 2000/01	Violent crime rank 2004/05	Change in rank	Burglary rank 2000/01	Burglary rank 2004/05	Change in rank
1 (most deprived)	25,760	27,046	1,285	25,603	24,890	-713
2	23,931	24,622	691	21,964	21,448	-516
3	21,866	22,242	376	20,029	19,742	-286
4	19,041	19,632	591	17,725	17,691	-34
5	16,615	16,906	291	15,977	16,110	133
6	14,280	14,207	-72	14,798	14,839	41
7	12,693	11,844	-850	13,814	13,669	-146
8	10,925	10,192	-733	12,581	12,742	160
9	9,751	8,830	-920	11,067	11,665	598
10 (least deprived)	7,553	6,894	-659	8,855	9,619	763

Source: SDRC, 2008; IMD 2004

**Table 12: (Figure 3.6(a)) Change in violent crime rankings by NRF and non-NRF LSOA decile, 2000/01 – 2004/05 – locally defined**

Local decile	NRF LADS			Non-NRF LADS		
	Violent crime rank 2000/01	Violent crime rank 2004/05	Change in rank	Violent crime rank 2000/01	Violent crime rank 2004/05	Change in rank
1 (most deprived)	26,873	27,935	1,063	20,797	22,982	2,185
2	25,142	26,197	1,055	17,465	19,223	1,757
3	23,804	24,569	765	15,611	16,638	1,027
4	22,836	23,226	391	14,042	14,667	625
5	21,821	21,905	85	12,665	12,899	233
6	20,526	19,995	-531	11,660	11,658	-2
7	19,205	18,229	-976	11,193	10,741	-452
8	17,911	16,264	-1,648	10,307	9,688	-618
9	16,563	14,372	-2,191	9,381	8,748	-633
10 (least deprived)	14,544	11,646	-2,898	8,054	7,152	-902

Source: SDRC, 2008; IMD 2004

**Table 13: (Figure 3.6(b)) Change in burglary rankings by NRF and non-NRF LSOA decile, 2000/01 – 2004/05 – locally defined**

Local decile	NRF LADS			Non-NRF LADS		
	Burglary rank 2000/01	Burglary rank 2004/05	Change in rank	Burglary rank 2000/01	Burglary rank 2004/05	Change in rank
1 (most deprived)	25,503	25,001	-502	16,328	17,176	847
2	23,984	23,370	-614	14,681	15,650	968
3	23,107	22,212	-895	14,129	14,904	775
4	22,509	21,427	-1,082	13,593	14,210	617
5	22,270	21,242	-1,029	12,830	13,547	717
6	21,863	20,692	-1,171	12,193	12,910	717
7	21,238	20,172	-1,065	11,537	12,218	681
8	20,136	18,874	-1,263	11,001	11,569	567
9	19,547	18,268	-1,280	10,234	10,414	180
10 (least deprived)	17,790	16,551	-1,239	8,897	9,572	675

Source: SDRC, 2008; IMD 2004

**Table 14: (Figure 3.7) Change in worklessness gap in NRF LADs, 2001/04 and 2004/07**

LAD	Gap between worst 10% 2001–2004	Gap between LAD and national average 2001–2004	Gap between worst 10% 2004–2007	Gap between LAD and national average 2004–2007
Allerdale	0.2	-0.9	0.0	-0.3
Ashfield	-0.3	-1.3	-1.0	-1.3
Barking and Dagenham	-0.4	1.0	-0.1	0.7
Barnet				
Barnsley	-0.6	-2.0	-0.3	-0.8
Barrow-in-Furness	0.0	-1.7	1.5	-2.0
Birmingham	-2.0	0.0	1.8	0.1
Blackburn with Darwen	1.3	-0.1	3.1	0.3
Blackpool	-0.3	0.1	0.8	0.7
Bolsover	1.1	-2.1	-0.3	-1.2
Bolton	0.7	0.3	0.1	0.6
Bradford	-1.5	-0.9	1.1	-0.4
Brent	1.2	0.9	0.1	0.9
Brighton and Hove	2.0	0.4	0.4	-0.4
Bristol	-2.4	0.1	-0.1	0.2
Burnley	2.5	0.3	2.2	0.6
Camden	-3.9	-1.3	-1.4	-0.2
Coventry	-2.7	0.0	0.8	0.1
Croydon	0.6	1.0	-0.1	0.6
Derby	-2.1	-0.6	-2.3	-0.9
Derwentside	-1.3	-2.0	-1.3	-1.4
Doncaster	-0.6	-1.3	1.4	-0.2
Dudley	0.2	0.7	0.6	0.4
Ealing	0.1	0.5	0.1	0.5
Easington	-2.1	-3.5	-0.8	-1.7

**Table 14: (Figure 3.7) Change in worklessness gap in NRF LADs, 2001/04 and 2004/07 (continued)**

LAD	Gap between worst 10% 2001-2004	Gap between LAD and national average 2001-2004	Gap between worst 10% 2004-2007	Gap between LAD and national average 2004-2007
Enfield	0.2	1.4	-0.4	1.1
Gateshead	-2.3	-2.5	-0.6	-1.4
Great Yarmouth	-4.7	0.3	1.6	0.2
Greenwich	-1.3	0.8	-1.0	0.5
Hackney	-0.3	0.0	-0.2	0.5
Halton	-0.5	-1.4	0.6	-0.1
Hammersmith and Fulham	-0.4	0.4	-0.3	0.7
Haringey	0.5	0.7	0.4	0.9
Hartlepool	-0.6	-2.0	-0.6	-1.6
Hastings	-0.1	0.9	0.6	0.5
Hyndburn	1.1	-0.1	-0.5	-0.2
Islington	-0.4	-0.7	0.3	0.0
Kensington and Chelsea	-2.2	-0.2	-1.5	0.2
Kerrier	-1.3	0.1	1.3	-0.3
Kingston upon Hull	0.3	-0.5	0.0	0.6
Kirklees	-0.3	-0.3	0.6	0.4
Knowsley	-2.0	-3.1	2.1	-1.0
Lambeth	1.0	0.4	0.3	0.5
Leeds	-3.3	-0.6	-0.5	-0.3
Leicester	-1.4	0.0	-1.1	0.2
Lewisham	-0.2	0.6	-0.1	0.5
Lincoln	-1.0	-0.5	-2.3	-0.7
Liverpool	-0.1	-2.8	0.7	-1.4
Luton	-0.1	1.1	0.5	0.0
Manchester	-1.1	-2.8	0.5	-1.3
Mansfield	1.5	-1.0	1.0	-1.0

**Table 14: (Figure 3.7) Change in worklessness gap in NRF LADs, 2001/04 and 2004/07 (continued)**

LAD	Gap between worst 10% 2001-2004	Gap between LAD and national average 2001-2004	Gap between worst 10% 2004-2007	Gap between LAD and national average 2004-2007
Middlesbrough	1.1	-1.1	0.1	-0.9
Newcastle-Upon-Tyne	-2.2	-2.6	-1.4	-2.0
Newham	0.2	-0.1	-0.1	-0.3
North East Lincolnshire				
North Tyneside	-0.4	-2.1	-0.3	-1.4
Norwich				
Nottingham	-2.3	-1.3	-2.2	-1.4
Oldham	0.7	-0.2	3.3	0.5
Pendle	0.9	0.1	-0.9	0.2
Penwith	-2.8	-1.0	0.7	0.1
Plymouth	-0.1	0.1	0.6	-0.3
Portsmouth	0.7	0.1	1.2	0.7
Preston	-1.1	-0.7	0.3	0.1
Redcar and Cleveland	1.4	-1.4	0.1	-1.4
Rochdale	1.8	0.0	0.4	0.6
Rotherham	-0.9	-0.8	1.5	-0.1
Salford	1.7	-0.7	1.9	-0.6
Sandwell	-1.1	0.6	3.0	0.4
Sedgefield	1.7	-1.5	0.7	-0.9
Sefton	-0.4	-1.0	1.0	-0.4
Sheffield	-1.7	-1.0	0.3	-0.7
South Tyneside	-1.9	-2.8	-1.6	-2.3
Southampton	-0.3	0.2	0.9	0.1
Southwark	-0.6	-0.1	0.1	0.5
St Helens	-1.5	-2.1	1.6	-0.3
Stockton-on-Tees	-0.4	-1.1	-0.3	-0.5

**Table 14: (Figure 3.7) Change in worklessness gap in NRF LADs, 2001/04 and 2004/07 (continued)**

LAD	Gap between worst 10% 2001-2004	Gap between LAD and national average 2001-2004	Gap between worst 10% 2004-2007	Gap between LAD and national average 2004-2007
Stoke-on-Trent	-0.5	-0.3	0.7	-0.1
Sunderland	0.9	-1.7	2.6	-0.5
Tameside	-0.4	-0.2	0.6	0.2
Tower Hamlets	0.3	-0.6	0.4	-0.3
Wakefield	-0.9	-0.9	1.3	-0.4
Walsall	-0.7	0.6	1.5	0.5
Waltham Forest	0.7	1.0	0.0	0.8
Wandsworth	0.3	0.2	0.4	0.5
Wansbeck	-1.2	-1.0	-1.4	-1.2
Wear Valley	0.4	-0.7	2.8	-0.1
Westminster	-1.2	-0.3	-1.6	0.1
Wigan	0.9	-1.2	1.6	-0.6
Wirral	-1.0	-1.5	0.2	-0.5
Wolverhampton	-1.2	0.6	1.5	0.7

Source: SDRC, 2008

**Table 15: (Figure 3.8) Change in KS4 points score by ethnicity, 2002–2006**

	10% most deprived NRF LSOAs		90% least deprived NRF LSOAs	
	2002	2006	2002	2006
Bangladeshi	267.587	282.4814	284.2	292.6702
Black African	249.57	259.8079	267.274	276.5005
Black Caribbean	226.144	250.3424	248.917	266.0914
Chinese	308.096	318.5087	331.075	342.9856
Indian	286.967	295.4884	313.99	324.3203
Pakistani	251.141	263.164	272.961	280.7395
White (British and Irish)	217.758	224.7805	285.044	290.1654
White other	231.626	244.9672	281.941	290.4191

Source: SDRC, 2008

# Annex 6

## Change in conditions for ethnic groups – use of proxies

In domains other than education there is no data on the extent of change for different ethnic groups. We have therefore, for worklessness, health and crime indicators, based a tentative analysis on the basis of ‘proxy’ LSOAs, that is those LSOAs which have a concentration of non-white groups of at least 10 per cent. Experian ‘Origins’ data has been used to establish the approximate percentage of population in each LSOA that is non-white.

The following Figures show the degree of absolute change in LSOAs with increasing thresholds of white or non-white concentrations.

Figure 1 contrasts the change in worklessness conditions for the non-white group in all LSOAs and in the most deprived 10 per cent, for the years 1999 and 2006. For England as a whole the worklessness rate increases as the proportion of the non-white population increases, although for the LSOAs with higher levels of non-white population the worklessness rate reduced significantly between 1999 and 2006. In contrast, in the 10 per cent most deprived LSOAs, there is a decreasing rate of worklessness as the concentration of non-white groups increases, again with significant absolute change between 1999 and 2006; in 2006 the worklessness rate in 90 per cent non-white LSOAs was only about 16 per cent, compared with 24 per cent for the 90 per cent LSOAs.





Figure 2. demonstrates a similar pattern for standardised mortality ratio in the health domain, with the ‘non-white’ LSOAs improving in the most deprived 10 per cent of areas


(though care should be taken not to attach too much importance to what are very small movements in the SMR).

**Figure 2: change in standardised mortality ratio for LSOAs with white/non-white concentrations, all LSOAs and the most deprived 10%**




Figures 3 and 4 suggest a slightly different picture in the crime domain. For both violent crime and burglary the rankings are consistently higher (i.e. worse) for ‘non-white’ LSOAs across England as a whole. However, within the most deprived 10 per cent of LSOAs, the rankings improve in line with the increasing proportion of non-white population.

**Figure 3: change in violent crime rankings for LSOAs with white/non-white concentrations, all LSOAs and the most deprived 10%**



**Figure 4: change in burglary rankings for LSOAs with white/non-white concentrations, all LSOAs and the most deprived 10%**



# Annex 7

## NSNR Evaluation – Follow up to review of 2006 NRF projects: report of survey on mainstreaming

### Introduction

Close to £3bn of NRF was allocated to local authorities (initially 88, with a review in 2004 when five were removed from the list and three added) over the period 2001 to 2008. This money was used in a variety of ways to support the aims of the NSNR. As well as the direct benefits – in the form of outputs and outcomes – stemming from this investment, of key interest to the evaluation was the extent to which the NRF served to influence the ways in which mainstream services are delivered in deprived areas. This influence could potentially take a variety of forms – including, for example, by providing initial “pump-priming” for new services or by testing new approaches.

In early 2006, as a contribution to the wider study of NRF carried out by York Consulting<sup>5</sup> for (the then) ODPM, AMION undertook a review of 155 projects/interventions that were being funded by NRF. One of the aspects covered in this review was the sustainability of the activity funded by NRF and the extent to which it was anticipated that this would influence or be absorbed into the mainstream provision.

In late 2007 AMION followed up this review by re-contacting as many as possible of the 155 projects to establish whether the activity undertaken by them was continuing or expected to continue when NRF funding ceased, and to what extent they appeared to be influencing mainstream provision. This paper summarises the results of the later review.

### Summary

155 NRF-funded projects were reviewed in early 2006. Of these, 123 were revisited. Caution should be exercised in extrapolating the results from these projects to NRF interventions more widely. While the projects selected comprised a broad mix of interventions – in terms of for example focus and type of activity, area, scale and degree of success – it was not possible to ensure that they were fully representative of the totality of NRF spend.

<sup>5</sup> CLG (2008) Impacts and Outcomes of the Neighbourhood Renewal Fund.

Overall there appears to have been an element of substitution in 19 per cent of all the interventions. The level of substitution was significantly higher in the health domain than in the other domains. There was some leverage of additional mainstream funds into projects also funded by NRF.

Of the 123 projects, activity had ceased, or was expected to cease when NRF finishes, in 25 (20 per cent). But at least 10 of these projects were in any case time-limited. In 15 cases the activity could have continued, but was either judged not to be needed or to have failed, or was not able to secure alternative funding. In only eight cases was activity not continuing or expected to continue because of a lack of funding. Five of these eight projects were led by the Voluntary and Community Sector (VCS).

Activity was continuing in 98 projects. In 59 per cent of these projects activity was continuing, or expected to continue, at the same or a higher level; the percentage was higher for those projects where NRF funding had ceased than for those projects where NRF had continued to March 2008. Where NRF had already finished, more activity had tended to be continuing at the same or a higher level in the crime and 'other' domains. There was little variation by lead agency, with activity continuing at at least as high a level in VCS-led projects as in LA-led projects.

Of the 38 interventions where NRF had ceased but activity was continuing, 26 (68 per cent) were being funded by the mainstream, with a further three projects partly funded by the mainstream. Over 50 per cent of projects still being funded by NRF anticipated that the activity would be mainstreamed, though experience suggests that these predictions can be over-optimistic. A relatively low proportion of VCS-led projects had secured mainstream funding for the activity to continue.

Of the 65 projects where there was or was expected to be an element of mainstream funding, in 60 per cent of cases the mainstream was considered, or was expected, to be putting in more resource than it would have done in the absence of the NRF project. The domain in which the mainstream was investing most additional expenditure was education.

## Methodology

In the course of the initial review, we interviewed the managers of 155 projects or interventions which together received over £90m NRF. We attempted to renew contact with most of these, though did not include the small number of projects which had in effect been small 'programmes', comprising a number – in some cases a large number – of individual projects.

Information was collected on:

- (a) whether the activity funded by the project was still continuing, and if not why not
- (b) where activity was continuing:
  - (i) whether this was at the same level as previously
  - (ii) whether NRF funding was continuing or not
  - (iii) if NRF funding had ceased, whether the activity was now being funded by the mainstream or another source
  - (iv) if NRF funding was continuing, whether the activity was likely to be mainstreamed when the NRF funding ceased.

The results given below are based primarily on the answers given directly to these questions, though they may, where indicated, draw on the opinion of the interviewer (who for the most part was the same person in both 2006 and 2007).

We believe that they provide some interesting conclusions on influence on the mainstream of 123 projects. However, we would emphasise caution in extrapolating these results to NRF-funded projects more generally, given that:

- the original selection of projects attempted to cover a range of different themes, lead agencies, sizes and types of project but was inevitably to some degree pragmatic and not necessarily representative of NRF spend overall; and
- we were not able to contact 100 per cent of the projects; moreover changes of project manager in some cases limited the quantity and quality of information that we could collect.

In addition, in some areas a large proportion of the projects were still continuing (to 31 March 2008) to be funded by NRF. This meant that in, a number of cases, a view on whether and how the activity would continue beyond March 2008 could only be based on informed guesswork, and some project managers simply did not feel able to give a view.

## **The themes**

Most projects have been categorised in one or other of the five main NSNR themes or domains. We have, however, used an 'other' category to accommodate those projects which do not fall clearly under one of these themes, usually because they were either cross-cutting across more than one theme, or because they focused on community development and cohesion.

## Definition of mainstream

There is not always agreement on what 'mainstream' provision means. For the purpose of the current exercise, we have regarded the following as 'mainstream':

- Education: the Local Education Authority, and individual schools and FE colleges
- Worklessness: Jobcentre Plus and LAs
- Crime/community safety: the police and LAs
- Health: Primary Care Trusts and LAs
- Environment and Housing: LAs.

We have not included in the 'mainstream' discretionary funding streams, such as DWP's Deprived Areas Fund, or discretionary Home Office programmes. We have included LAs as mainstream providers of worklessness services, although the responsibility of LAs to provide these services may be considered more discretionary than their duties to provide within the other domains.

## Results

### Level of response

Of the original 155 projects interviewed in early 2006, we were able to contact or obtain information on 123 projects.

Of these:

- in 62 cases, NRF funding had finished.
- in 61 cases NRF funding was continuing until the end of March 2008.

Table 4.1 shows how these were broken down by domain, by lead agency and by whether NRF funding had ceased or was continuing to end March 2008.


Theme	LA		Other public		VCS		Total
	NRF finished	NRF unfinished	NRF finished	NRF unfinished	NRF finished	NRF unfinished	
Crime	6	9	5	3	1	5	<b>29</b>
Worklessness	1	8	0	2	3	5	<b>19</b>
Education	10	5	0	3	2	2	<b>22</b>
Health	4	1	4	3	1	2	<b>15</b>
Liveability	8	5	1	0	2	3	<b>19</b>
Other	3	2	–	–	11	3	<b>19</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>123</b>

### Relationship to the mainstream during the period of NRF funding

There would seem to be three main ways in which mainstream funding can relate to NRF funding:

- (a) substitution or partial substitution – where NRF funds activity that would have been undertaken by the mainstream
- (b) addition – where NRF funds activity additional to that funded by the mainstream (e.g. with particular neighbourhood focus); and
- (c) leverage – where NRF funding results in more mainstream funding being devoted to the activity.

Figure 4.1 illustrates these three models. The second situation, (i.e. B) with NRF additional to the mainstream, seemed to be the most common.



### (i) Substitution: would the mainstream have funded the activity that NRF funded?

In some cases, where there was no funding other than NRF involved in the project, we asked simply – would the mainstream have funded the project in the absence of NRF? In others, where a project involved a cocktail of funding, including perhaps more than one source of mainstream funds and/or other regeneration monies, the question we posed was similar – in the absence of NRF, would the mainstream have funded that element of the project that was dependent on the NRF funding?

The responses to this question, which in some cases are based partly on the informed view of the researcher, are set out in Table 4.2.

Table 4.2 sets out for all projects whether the mainstream would or might have funded the activity, or a part of it, or funded it on a smaller scale or in slower time.

Theme	Yes	Yes – possibly, in part, more slowly, on a smaller scale	All “yes”, as % of total	No	DK	Total
Crime	1	5	20.6	19	4	<b>29</b>
Worklessness	1	3	21.0	15		<b>19</b>
Education	0	3	13.63	17	2	<b>22</b>
Health		7	46.7	8		<b>15</b>
Housing/ environment	1	1	10.5	17		<b>19</b>
Other		1	5.3	18		<b>19</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>18.7%</b>	<b>94</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>123</b>

This suggests that overall there was an element of substitution in 19 per cent of all the interventions. The level of substitution was significantly higher in the health domain than in the other domains.

### (ii) Leverage: did the mainstream invest more funds in the activity during the period of NRF funding?

We also considered whether the mainstream had put more funding into the activity than they would have done in the absence of NRF. In this way we attempted to ascertain in how many cases NRF had in this way levered additional mainstream funding into the activity, and were able to identify 14 instances. However, the actual figure may be higher; it was not always possible to establish what was likely to have happened in the absence of NRF.

### Relationship to the mainstream following the period of NRF funding

This section considers what had happened since NRF ceased, or what was likely to happen after NRF funding ceases.

#### (i) Is the activity funded by NRF still continuing/likely to continue?

We first of all established whether the activity funded by NRF was still continuing, or likely to continue, after NRF funding ceased. In the case of 25 projects, the activity itself had ceased – or was expected to cease when NRF funding finished.

But at least 10 of these projects were in any case time-limited. In 15 cases the activity could have continued, but was either judged not to be needed or to have failed, or was not able to secure alternative funding. In only eight cases was activity not continuing or expected to continue because of a lack of funding. Five of these eight projects were led by the VCS.

#### (ii) Where activity was continuing, was this continuing or expected to continue at the same level, a lower level or a higher level?

Activity was continuing in the case of 98 projects, of which:

- in 39 cases, NRF had finished but the activity was continuing
- in 61 cases NRF was continuing until March 2008, but the activity was not expected to continue thereafter in two cases and was uncertain in a further five.

Where activity was continuing, or expected to continue after March 2008, project managers were asked whether this would be at the same level, a higher level, or a lower level.

Table 4.3 shows a breakdown by theme of the projects where NRF had already finished.

Theme	Lower		Same level		Higher		Total
Crime	2	18.2%	8	72.7%	1	9.1%	<b>11</b>
Worklessness	3	100%	–		–		<b>3</b>
Education	3	33.3%	2	22.2%	4	44.4%	<b>9</b>
Health	3	42.8%	1	14.3%	3	42.8%	<b>7</b>
Housing/envt	2	50%	–		2	50%	<b>4</b>
Other	–		3	60%	2	40%	<b>5</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>33.3%</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>35.9%</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>30.8%</b>	<b>39</b>

In 26 out of 39 projects (66%), activity was continuing at the same or a higher level. The proportion was highest in the ‘other’ and crime domains, and lowest in the worklessness domain.

Table 4.4 gives a breakdown by theme of those projects where NRF was continuing until the end of March 2008.

Table 4.4: Was activity expected to continue after NRF ceased in March 2008?									
Theme	Lower		Same level		Higher		Don't know		Total
Crime	7	43.7%	7	43.7%	1	6.2%	1	6.2%	<b>16</b>
Worklessness	6	40%	7	46.7%	2	13.3%			<b>15</b>
Education	3	30%	6	60%	–		1	10%	<b>10</b>
Health	2	40%	–		2	40%	1	20%	<b>5</b>
Housing/envt	3	37.5%	3	37.5%	–		2	25%	<b>8</b>
Other	1	20%	2	40%	2	40%	–		<b>5</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>37.3%</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>42.4%</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>11.9%</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>8.5%</b>	<b>59</b>

In 32 out of 59 projects (54%), activity was expected to continue at the same or higher level. The lower overall percentage may reflect the fact that these projects were by definition those which have had to rely on NRF to the end of the NRF programme and expectations may therefore have been lower. The percentage was highest for the 'other' projects and lowest in the health and housing/environment domains.

The variations between the domains in the levels of continuing activity – both actual where NRF had finished and expected where NRF was continuing until March 2008 – are shown in Figure 4.2. The worklessness and housing/environment domains both showed decreasing numbers of interventions at the same and higher levels.




Table 4.5 shows continuing levels of activity of the projects where NRF had already finished, broken down by lead agency:

<b>Table 4.5: At what level was activity continuing after NRF had ceased – by lead agency</b>							
<b>Lead agency</b>	<b>Lower level</b>		<b>Same level</b>		<b>Higher level</b>		<b>Total</b>
LA	6	33.3%	5	27.8%	7	38.9%	<b>18</b>
Other public	3	30%	4	40%	3	30%	<b>10</b>
VCS	4	36.4%	5	45.4%	2	18.2%	<b>11</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>33.3%</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>35.9%</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>30.8%</b>	<b>39</b>

The type of lead agency appeared to make little difference to the level of continuing activity: activity was continuing at the same or a higher level in 66 per cent of LA-led projects compared with 64 per cent of VCS-led projects.

Table 4.6 gives a breakdown by type of lead agency of those projects where NRF was continuing until the end of March 2008.

<b>Table 4.6: At what level was activity expected to continue after NRF ceased in March 2008 – by type of lead agency</b>									
<b>Lead agency</b>	<b>Lower</b>		<b>Same level</b>		<b>Higher</b>		<b>Don't know</b>		<b>Total</b>
LA	12	41.4%	13	44.8%	2	6.9%	2	6.9%	<b>29</b>
Other public	4	40%	2	20%	2	20%	2	20%	<b>10</b>
VCS	6	28.6%	10	47.6%	3	14.3%	1	4.8%	<b>21</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>37.3%</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>42.4%</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>11.9%</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>8.5%</b>	<b>59</b>

The activity was expected to continue in a higher proportion of VCS-led projects, 66 per cent, compared with 52 per cent of LA-led projects.

### **(iii) Was the mainstream providing, or expected to provide, the funding?**

We then considered who was funding, or was expected to fund, the continuing activity.

For 39 projects where NRF had ceased but the activity was continuing, we asked project managers who were now the primary funders.

Table 4.7 gives a breakdown by theme:

<b>Table 4.7: Funding of projects where NRF had ceased – by theme</b>						
<b>Theme (no of projects)</b>	<b>Mainstream</b>		<b>Other regeneration funds</b>		<b>Combination</b>	
	Crime (11)	9	80%	2	20%	0
Worklessness (3)	2	66%	1	33%	0	
Education (9)	6	66%	2	22%	1	11%
Health (8)	7	87%	1	12%	0	
Housing/envt (4)	2	50%	2	50%	0	
Other (4)	1	25%	2	50%	1	25%
<b>Total (39)</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>69%</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>26%</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>5%</b>

Overall, 27 out of 39 projects (69%) were now being funded by the mainstream, with a further three projects partly funded by the mainstream.

Table 4.8 gives a breakdown by lead agency.

<b>Table 4.8: Funding of projects where NRF had ceased – by lead agency</b>						
<b>Lead agency (no of projects)</b>	<b>Mainstream</b>		<b>Other regen</b>		<b>Combination</b>	
	LA (19)	16	84.2%	2	10.5%	–
Other public (9)	8	88.9%	1	11.1%	–	
VCS (11)	2	18.2%	7	63.6%	2	18.2%
<b>Total (39)</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>66.7%</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>25.6%</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>5.1%</b>

A relatively low proportion of VCS-led projects had secured mainstream funding for the activity to continue.

#### **(iv) How did this match expectation in 2006?**

We compared expectations with actual outcomes. All project managers were asked in early 2006 whether they expected that their activity would be mainstreamed. Of the 62 projects where NRF funding had since ceased, 28 were still receiving NRF in early 2006, and of these 28, 21 (75%) said then that they expected that the activity would be mainstreamed in whole or in part.

Table 4.9 shows whether in practice mainstream funding was secured, by theme.

<b>Table 4.9: Was mainstream funding actually secured?</b>							
<b>Theme</b>	<b>Yes</b>		<b>In part</b>		<b>No</b>		<b>Total</b>
Crime	5	83%			1	17%	<b>6</b>
Worklessness	1	50%			1	50%	<b>2</b>
Education	3	75%			1	25%	<b>4</b>
Health	3	75%			1	25%	<b>4</b>
Housing/envt	1	50%			1	50%	<b>2</b>
Other			1	33%	2	66%	<b>3</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>61%</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>6%</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>33%</b>	<b>21</b>

14 projects (67%) out of the 21 that anticipated mainstream funding (in whole or in part) subsequently received it. However, there were also other cases where projects that did not expect to be mainstreamed did in fact receive mainstream funds.

#### **(v) What were the expectations of those projects that were still receiving NRF?**

For projects where NRF was still continuing and activity was expected to continue post NRF, we asked project managers whether they foresaw the mainstream taking over funding.


Table 4.10 gives their responses.

<b>Table 4.10: Who will fund the activity post NRF?</b>							
<b>Theme</b>	<b>Mainstream</b>				<b>Other regeneration funding</b>		<b>Total</b>
	<b>In full</b>		<b>Possibly /in part</b>				
Crime	10	66%	2	13%	3	20%	<b>15</b>
Worklessness	4	29%	3	21%	7	50%	<b>14</b>
Education	4	40%	2	20%	4	40%	<b>10</b>
Health	2	40%			3	60%	<b>5</b>
Housing/Envt	1	17%	3	50%	2	33%	<b>6</b>
Other	1	20%	1	20%	3	60%	<b>5</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>40%</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>20%</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>40%</b>	<b>55</b>

60 per cent of these projects were anticipating mainstream funding in whole or in part, with a particularly high proportion of crime projects falling into this category. (The Working Neighbourhoods Fund had not been announced when we spoke to project managers).

**(vi) After NRF funding had come to an end, were mainstream providers funding or expected to fund the activity at a higher level than they would otherwise have done in the absence of the NRF intervention?**

Finally, we considered whether, after NRF had ceased, the mainstream was funding or was expected to fund the activity to a greater extent than it would otherwise have done. In other words, as a result of the programme, had additional mainstream resource been levered into supporting the activity, or will it be? In some instances the mainstream was clearly picking up from NRF the cost of the continuing service, with additional mainstream funding being levered into the activity (see (a) in Fig 4.1). However, there were instances where the activity was being funded to some extent before NRF, and was continuing post NRF at a lower level than when it was receiving NRF – effectively the mainstream appeared only to be maintaining its previous contribution (see (b) in Fig 4.3).



Where activity was continuing, or expected to continue, with at least an element of mainstream funding, we considered whether more mainstream resource was being invested than would have been the case in the absence of NRF. Again the responses to this question were based on the researchers' informed views as well as the comments of the project managers.

Table 4.11 gives the responses by theme.

<b>Table 4.11: Was more mainstream funding going in or expected to go into activity?</b>							
<b>Theme</b>	<b>Yes</b>		<b>No</b>		<b>Don't know</b>		<b>Total</b>
crime	13	59%	5	23%	4	18%	<b>22</b>
worklessness	5	56%	2	22%	2	22%	<b>9</b>
education	11	85%	1	8%	1	8%	<b>13</b>
health	5	55%	4	44%			<b>9</b>
housing/envt	4	50%			4	50%	<b>8</b>
other	1	25%	3	75%			<b>4</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>60%</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>23%</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>17%</b>	<b>65</b>

Of the 65 projects where there was or was expected to be an element of mainstream funding, in 60 per cent of cases the mainstream was considered, or expected, to be putting in more resource than it would have done in the absence of the NRF project. The domain in which the mainstream was investing most additional expenditure was education.

## Conclusions: issues raised

In summary, the previous sections show that the activity funded by NRF in 54 per cent of those projects that were not time-limited was continuing or expected to continue with mainstream funding, in whole or in part. Table 4.12 shows how this picture varied between the different domains.

**Table 4.12: Summary of mainstreaming of activity funded by NRF**

	<b>Continuing or expecting to continue (at some level) with mainstream funding (in whole or in part)</b>		<b>Not continuing, or continuing with funding other than the mainstream</b>		<b>Total</b>
Crime	20	71.4%	8	28.6%	28
Worklessness	9	47.4%	10	52.7%	19
Education	13	65.0%	7	35.0%	20
Health	9	60.0%	6	40.0%	15
Housing/envt	6	40.0%	9	60.0%	15
Other	4	25.0%	12	75.0%	16
<b>Total</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>54.0%</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>46.0%</b>	<b>113</b>

Where the mainstream was contributing, it was estimated that in 60 per cent of cases it was contributing more to the activity than it would have done in the absence of NRF.

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