

Creativity and Consciousness: The ontological foundations of art

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Introduction

Art and artists have a long history of epistemic enquiry concerning the relation of mind and world, and many great philosophers have at some point turned to art as a means of exploring the ineffable nature of subjective experience. More recently, with technological advances providing privileged access to the inner workings of the brain, a recognised discipline of neuroaesthetics has emerged as science also turns to art as a means to better understand our perceptual processes.

In tandem with this renewed focus on what ‘aesthetic’ experience can reveal about the workings of the brain, science also continues to search for a defining ‘function’ for art from within an established evolutionary model – a project that, as yet, is unable to arrive at any significant consensus. It is my contention that a solution to these enduring puzzles – the nature of consciousness and the function of art – both rest on a better understanding of human ontology.

I will begin by outlining the basis of the ‘hard problem’ of consciousness, its foundation on the subject-object structure of ‘common-sense’ metaphysics, and how alternative ontologies in the Kantian tradition present this structure as a falsehood. I will propose that some descriptions of the fundamental role of art to emerge from this alternative perspective connect in significant respects with particular modern scientific and phenomenological theories of conscious perception. Finally I will identify aspects of these theories that might form the basis of future research by contemporary art practitioners wanting to engage with consciousness studies.

The puzzle of conscious experience

The ‘hard problem’ of consciousness for philosophy and science emerges from the way in which many of us tend to think of our ‘selves’ – that is as some kind of non-physical ‘soul’ or spirit housed *within* a body.¹ ‘Dualism’, although now roundly dismissed by modern science, nonetheless endures at the intuitive and ‘functional’ heart of our common-sense metaphysics – our everyday understanding of life. Yet despite the centuries of advance in scientific knowledge about the physical world since Descartes’s famous aphorism, we are still unable to provide a definitive description of how physical matter can give rise to subjective experience.

William James’s ‘stream of consciousness’ and Bernard Baars’s ‘global workspace theory’ are examples of the many metaphors that have been employed in an attempt to describe the ‘contents’ of consciousness.² However, many of these descriptions have been criticised for invoking what Daniel Dennett has dubbed the ‘Cartesian theatre’: a metaphorical ‘internal space’, where consciousness is played out. This, he claims, serves only to remove the real problem to another ‘internal’ viewer – the infamous ‘homunculus’ – and an infinite regress.³

Other approaches, including Dennett’s ‘multiple drafts’ concept, have attempted to solve this problem by questioning the orthodox axioms that underpin our intuitive notion of conscious experience and in doing so have raised profound implications for the idea of an enduring and continuous ‘self’. More recently, philosopher and cognitive scientist Alva Noë has also challenged the exclusively ‘neural-based’ description of consciousness with his ‘sensory motor account’ of visual perception.⁴

While answers to the true nature of consciousness still remain elusive, we can at least be confident that the model of ‘everyday’ dualism has now been long exhausted as a solution.

Rejecting a subject-object division

The subject-object divide as a ‘concept’ with which to engage with the everyday world will nonetheless endure for the human organism, as its origin is founded in an evolutionarily advantageous model for survival. However, this ontology is only one way in which reality can be conceptualised,

and one that has been widely and extensively challenged in modern philosophy, principally in the Kantian tradition:

the common-sense notion of a mind-independent world that shapes experience is rejected by Kant on the grounds that experience requires its own structure to hang together, and this leads him to conclude that what we take to be the structure of the world is in fact the structure of experience.⁵

The world, therefore, counter to ‘common-sense metaphysics’, is perhaps better described in terms of ‘processes’ or ‘interactions’ and our perception of a world full of discrete objects as the result of the ‘constructive’ nature of human ontology, rather than any base condition of (absolute) reality.⁶

Although this notion is counter-intuitive, it is nonetheless one that now permeates orthodox theory across many disciplines; from descriptions of the ‘self’ in psychology⁷ to the quantum mechanical understanding of the sub-atomic world, where ‘atoms or the elementary particles themselves are not as real [...] [but] form a world of potentialities or possibilities rather than one of things or facts’.⁸

In neurobiology, our ‘direct’ subjective sense of reality can be similarly described as the ‘processing’ of a vast number of patterns that form the basis of brain functionality. Indeed, the temporal emergence of these patterns, or ‘neural networks’, clearly constitutes part of the process by which ‘objects in the world’ emerge for us.⁹ These sensory neural patterns are created and re-created to develop and establish ‘concepts’ through which we can begin to communicate our unique subjective experiences.¹⁰

The lack of a definitive, exclusively neural-based description of conscious experience has seen a subsequent re-emergence of phenomenology and a renewed focus on ‘embodied’ descriptions of consciousness in recent years. However, despite these theoretical differences, what seems to remain pervasive is the concept-driven, process-based nature of subjectivity, even if this remains concealed from our everyday understanding. Maurice Merleau-Ponty accounts for this ‘hidden’ aspect of perception:

[the senses] make it their business to cover their tracks as they organise experience in such a way that it presents to us a world of things arrayed before us in a three-dimensional objective space within which we are located as just another object. So as we get on with our life we do not notice the role of the senses in organising experience and ‘constituting’ the physical world.¹¹

The fact that the brain appears to ‘project’ its internally generated concepts *into* the physical world as wholly separate and ‘concrete’ entities is founded on an established, evolutionarily advantageous, method for survival.

To better cope with the onslaught of infinite sensory stimuli and prioritise more – potentially threatening – dynamic stimuli, our perceptual processes ‘habituate’ to stable and regular sensations. As a result of this demarcation of sense-data, the majority of our ‘conceptual constructions’ are therefore able to employ themselves, functionally, as ‘objects’ in the world. This then provides a survival dividend for the organism by setting aside the aspects of its world of which it has established prior knowledge and understanding, in order to more nimbly negotiate its way through an environment in constant flux. This functionally expedient process, however, results in a subsequent inhibition of our creative ability to develop *new* conceptions, which is where art comes in.¹²

Indeed, it is the hidden discord between our ‘internal’ conceptions of the world and the nature of the world ‘in itself’ that have prompted many philosophers to want to describe art as a means via which the truth of this relationship can be revealed.

Art and metaphysics

So what is ‘Art’ and what does it do for us? The need to conceptualise or ‘slice up the world’ in order to better function as a autonomous (organised) organism is the basis of the subject object

division. The inevitable tension or discord this conceptual separation of matter produces is what constitutes our ‘experience’. As Merleau-Ponty has suggested, if our ‘concepts’ and reality matched exactly then the two would ‘blend into’ one another and sensation ‘would vanish at the moment of formation’.¹³

This appearance/reality distinction, its consequences for human experience, and its relation to a function for art can be identified as common factors emerging from various different theories in both science and philosophy.

One such theory is set out by neurobiologist Semir Zeki in his book *Splendours & Miseries of the Brain* in which he describes the formation of concepts – our ‘internal’ hypotheses of absolute reality – as the primary function of the brain.

Zeki tells us that while certain brain-concepts are ‘inherited’ – such as the way we experience colour – others are ‘acquired’ through experience and will evolve over time, their character being determined by our engagement with the world. Our acquired concept of a ‘house’ or ‘car’, for instance, will depend on *all* ongoing experiences we have with houses or cars throughout our lives.

This neurobiological process first involves the abstraction of sensory stimuli, in both single cells and across sensory modules, followed by the synthesis of this information to form complex concepts. The key thesis in Zeki’s book, in terms of art, is that brain-concepts acquired over time will inevitably be a synthesis of *many* experiences, and while this is a hugely efficient way to successfully negotiate the environment – negating the need to assess every phenomenal encounter as if for the first time – it is nonetheless done so at a price.

Because this synthesis then forms an ‘ideal’ concept to which our ongoing experience can continually refer, any single temporal encounter with a particular example of that concept will never truly match-up to the ideal version – we therefore exist in a state of continual perceptual dissatisfaction, hence the ‘miseries’ of the book’s title. Artists, says Zeki, in striving to overcome this existential misery, attempt to create their perfect ‘ideal’ in a work of art, be it a symphony, a novel or a painting.

Zeki’s descriptions of ‘concept formation’ not only serving as the (hidden) basis of our everyday interactions with the world but also as the origin and motivation for art can be heard echoing in Pablo Picasso’s famous declaration that ‘art is a lie that makes us realise truth’.

The revelatory activity of the work of art

The reason art is able to reveal the basis of our everyday reality as merely conceptual lies in its ability to transform the object world in our perception of it. Noë has supported this idea in suggesting that ‘what makes a picture distinctively a work of art is precisely that [the] background presupposition is not clear, its [conceptually still] all in play’.¹⁴ The idea that art’s capacity to remain conceptually fluid is what marks it out from the everyday, is also attested to by Kant’s description of great art as expressing:

[a content] that induce[s] much thought, yet without the possibility of any definite thought whatever, that is concept, being adequate to it, and which language, consequently, can never quite get on level terms with, or render completely intelligible.¹⁵

Similarly, Schopenhauer writes:

we are entirely satisfied by the impression of a work of art only when it leaves behind something we cannot bring down to the distinctness of a concept.¹⁶

Seen in these terms, objects that resist functional categorisation will remain open to re-interpretation and therefore conceptually fluid. Any perceived object that endures this process and resists concrete definition therefore has the potential to be understood as art. Art, comprehended in this way, also therefore provides the possibility to appreciate the purely ‘conceptual’ nature of all

‘concrete’ objects present in our experience.

The appearance/reality distinction, and art’s revelatory qualities in relation to it, has been identified by a number of philosophers in the Kantian tradition, although their exemplars of art and the functions they perform have often differed in more detailed respects. For Schopenhauer this ontological separation was distinguished as the ‘Representation and the Will’, for Nietzsche as the ‘Apollonian’ and ‘Dionysian’,¹⁷ and for Heidegger as ‘World’ and ‘Earth’.¹⁸

What endures for these philosophers is Kant’s distinction between, on the one hand, the ‘phenomenal’ world as we perceive it through time and space and as organised by the law of causality, and on the other, the ‘noumenal’ world, the world ‘as it is in itself’ removed from perceptual and conceptual conditions. For Kant, knowledge of this noumenal world is not possible, yet for others art has been variously described as a means to bridge this existential divide or in some way reveal it.

For Schopenhauer it was only through music – situated at the top of his hierarchy of the arts – that we can have a direct attunement to the noumenal world. As the most immediate of all the arts, it moves us directly, without the need for visual or lingual representations, so facilitating access to our ‘noumenal essence’ in a powerful way.¹⁹

For Heidegger the broad meaning of art in his ontology was taken from the Greeks as ‘a happening of truth’, which he described as the ‘opening up of world’. To understand one’s world was to understand what, fundamentally, there is or the ‘ontological’ aspect of world, and Heidegger often appealed to this conception in describing the revelatory activity of the work of art.

The phenomenological depth of visual art

It is possible to see artists’ response to such ontological perspectives implicit in the transition achieved by modern art, from depicting reality to depicting ‘the experience of reality’, the seed of which first emerged in the paintings of Cézanne and subsequent artists’ movements in the early twentieth century. Merleau-Ponty has described Cézanne’s painting, in being somewhere between representation and abstraction, as revelatory of the embodied nature of sensation. He suggests:

the painting is as much a record of its own production, of Cézanne’s negotiations between looking, loading his brush, moving his body, and placing the brush on the canvas, as it is a record of the mountain before him. The colours are first and foremost dabs, gestures that retain their status as gestures, yet which nonetheless coalesce to create the appearance of a landscape. His dabs perform the balancing act between displaying their bodily origin, and an arrangement which invites us to see ‘through the dabs’ to an image beyond.²⁰

A more modern and explicit example of this idea can be witnessed in Gillian Carnegie’s 2002 oil painting *Black Square*.²¹ On first encounter with this work all one sees is a thick black impenetrable mass of paint. On closer inspection, however, and over time, what emerges is a woodland scene constructed in relief out of the dense impasto. This capacity of visual art to ‘appear’ to be two things at once, in experience, is unpicked further by Paul Crowther in his recent book *Phenomenology of the Visual Arts* (even the frame).

Crowther suggests that our intuitive sense of significance in the ‘aesthetic’ experience extends beyond the visual unities and harmonies of line or colour. The ‘intrinsic significance of the image’ lies in its capacity to manifest aspects that are fundamental to embodiment, perception, and space-occupancy. That is to say the image ‘exemplifies factors which are basic to our cognitive and metaphysical inherence in the world’.

The first of these factors can be seen in the process of ‘making’, as undertaken by the artist, which Crowther suggests models the human perceptual situation *per se*:

the world’s aspects and contours reconfigure in strict correlation with the body’s coordinated movement and activity [...] Likewise, we are compelled to change our bodily orientation in response to what the world thrusts upon us.²²

Art, it is said, can also reflect the ‘temporal’ relation we have to the world. Our ‘conscious present’ and bodily position does not simply arise from nothing, it is contingent on the structure of immediate past experience and subsequent anticipations of the future. Similarly, Crowther states that the created visual work displays many of the factors involved in its own physical causal history and in so doing, directly exemplifies the dependence of present states of affairs and perceptual givens upon their past states, by preserving those states in the work’s immediate ‘phenomenal presence’.

A third factor in visual art’s ‘phenomenological depth’ proposed by Crowther echoes Merleau-Ponty’s earlier description in its capacity to exemplify the most general structure of the human condition itself – namely consciousness’s apparent correlation with, and emergence from, a physical body. Our conscious lives ‘in large part involve mental representations where we literally imagine our bodies being located at other positions in space or time’ and part of the ‘phenomenological depth’ exemplified by the image is its apparent ‘projection of a virtual content from a material base’(Crowther, p. 27). For Crowther it is our intuitive recognition of this, in visual art, that holds a certain fascination and magic for us. It is a ‘conceptual truth that two different material bodies cannot share the same spatio-temporal position simultaneously’ (Crowther, p. 27). Yet art at least gives the appearance of overcoming this truth.²³

A challenge for contemporary art

The task [of art] [...] is to ‘see the enigma’, not to ‘solve’ it.²⁴

These perspectives therefore suggest that art gives us the opportunity to ‘witness’ the nature our perceptual engagement with the world; that the conceptual truths of space and time, and our conscious experience are, in fact, constructive ‘processes’. That is to say, we are not objects *in*, or separate *from*, the world, but rather, are ‘in ourselves’ the process that constitutes the world.

In understanding perceptual experience and human ontology in this way – as a ‘creative’ process – the experiments needed to manifest these theories can naturally orientate themselves toward art and the creativity of art practice.

Approaches to art making

What particular approaches to ‘making’ might contemporary artists employ that would help trigger a perceptual change in the viewer’s understanding of a work of art from something corporeally external and disconnected to an experiential process that they themselves initiate or construct?²⁵

One recent process-based approach to be used by artists particularly interested in perception, can be found in the work of James Turrell²⁶ or Anthony McCall²⁷ who dispense with the art object altogether and simply use ‘light’ itself to explore our perceptions. Turrell is clearly conscious of how his work relates to the viewer when he states that, counter to our intuitions, ‘we are part of constructing or building [the] reality in which we live, so – that which we behold, is actually something that we create’.²⁸

Described in these terms then, perception is perhaps best seen as a kind of ‘toolbox’, which each of us then uses to manufacture our own reality, and the work of an artist is not really about the making of paintings or objects at all, but in dealing with the state of our consciousness and the shape of our perceptions.²⁹

To move away from the ‘external object’ as the focus of art practice is therefore one approach by which artists might prompt the viewer into becoming more aware of her/his perceptual processes.

The danger, for me, in this approach is that by moving the focus away from an ‘externally’ located physical object we might (unintentionally) encourage the intuitive idea that the world we inhabit and our experiences are separate. The common-sense metaphysical structure of subject-object inevitably prompts us to understand any challenge to our ‘subjective’ experience as emerging

from a *misreading* of the ‘real’ world; as a ‘psychological’ effect rather than a part of the fundamentally ‘ontological’ process via which the world emerges for us.

The real challenge for contemporary artists engaged with consciousness studies therefore, is to attempt to produce art that provides the possibility of ‘usurping’ its status as an object when engaged directly, of disrupting the subject-object divide, and of revealing our experience of *all* objects as conceptual constructions.

An example of this can be found in the forms produced by the artist Anish Kapoor, which confront the viewer with art objects that question their seemingly obvious ‘external’ location by somehow disrupting our perceptions as we engage with them.³⁰

Kapoor’s work is also non-representational, which is another useful approach to making art that seeks to question our ontological nature, and was alluded to in Merleau-Ponty’s earlier description of the paintings of Cézanne who began the first tentative moves away from representation toward abstraction.

Art that is explicitly representational will, by its very nature, immediately present the viewer with a pre-established and largely concrete concept for contemplation, and therefore reduce any opportunity to expose the perceptual processes at hand. An abstracted or non-representational approach, however, better enables the viewer to consciously witness the more gradual emergence or building of his or her own conceptual understanding.

Noë suggests that what he terms ‘experiential art’ can play a role in phenomenological investigation by providing an occasion for the viewer to catch themselves ‘in the act’ of perceptual exploration.³¹ This description of the ‘work’ art performs also correlates with what Jennifer McMahon has dubbed ‘Naturalised Aesthetics’,³² a process that describes how ‘when we experience beauty we are actually becoming aware of the processes which solve the problem of perception’.³³

Allied to the abstracted forms of Kapoor’s work is a third advantageous approach to art making in this field – one of monumental scale. This is a factor also used to great effect by sculptor Richard Serra in his towering curves of oxidised steel³⁴ – an artist who explicitly posits the viewers’ experience as the ‘content’ of his work.³⁵ I would suggest that it is partly this application of scale that accomplishes the same sense of ‘immersion’, in both these artists’ ‘object-based’ artworks, as that achieved by the objectless light-works of Turrell and McCall. Importantly, it is the sense of ‘immersion’ – of existential fusion – that begins to disrupt the intuitive idea of ‘self’ as separated from the world, and ultimately undermines a subject-object structure for our ontology.³⁶

What is it that connects these different, yet advantageous, approaches to making art that relates to consciousness studies in this way? I would suggest that the answer resides in their capacity to draw out a ‘temporal space’ in our perceptual experience – one in which the conceptual understanding of our ‘selves’ as subject and the work as briefly becomes less certain.

It is my contention, therefore, that understanding what happens phenomenologically and neurologically during this process – what constitutes this ‘conceptually fluid’ temporal space – should be of great interest to artists, and can now form a significant focus for practice-based research for any artist wanting to contribute to current debate in the field of consciousness studies.

Conclusion

In considering how the fundamental subject-object aspect of common-sense metaphysics might underpin enduring problems in descriptions of human consciousness, I have suggested that the solution may lie in alternative, ‘process-based’ descriptions of human ontology.

I have also suggested how the constructive nature of such ontology enables us to ‘make sense’ of experience and described how art, in its various forms can exemplify, or mirror, essential aspects of this perceptual process.

It would seem, therefore, that the nature of our visual experience and in particular, its relation to the temporal basis of consciousness is now a fertile field for cross-disciplinary research – one that is clearly evidenced by the keenness of both science and philosophy to co-opt art in order to support their investigations.

A real opportunity now exists for artists to engage directly with the distinct disciplines of

neuroaesthetics and phenomenology in order to extend knowledge in this area – perhaps providing for a more direct and focused art-making that can better facilitate an examination of the ‘temporal’ processes, both neurological and phenomenological, by which the ‘object’ world emerges for us.

NOTES

1. David J. Chalmers, 'The Puzzle of Conscious Experience', *Scientific American*, December 1995, pp. 62–68.
2. Susan Blackmore, *Consciousness: An Introduction*, London: Hodder & Stoughton, 2003.
3. Daniel C. Dennett, *Consciousness Explained*, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1993.
4. Alva Noë, and J. Kevin O'Regan, 'On the Brain-Basis of Visual Consciousness: A Sensorimotor Account', *Vision and Mind*, ed. by Alva Noë, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002, pp. 567–98.
5. Clive Cazeaux, 'Aesthetics as Ecology', *Artful Ecologies 2: Art, Nature & Environment Conference*, University College Falmouth, 2008.
6. Process thought is evidenced in much modern philosophy from Schopenhauer to Merleau-Ponty, although probably the most comprehensive description was proposed by Alfred North Whitehead. See Alfred North Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, ed. by David Ray Griffin and Donald W. Sherburne, second revised edition, New York: MacMillan, 1979.
7. Ian Craib, 'Conclusion: Experiencing Identity', *Experiencing Identity*, London: Sage, 1998, pp. 168–77.
8. Manjit Kumar, *Quantum: Einstein, Bohr and the Great Debate About the Nature of Reality*, Cambridge: Icon Books, 2008, p. 262.
9. Semir Zeki, *A Vision of the Brain*, London: Blackwell Science, 1993.
10. Semir Zeki, *Splendours and Miseries of the Brain*, Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009.
11. Thomas Baldwin, 'Introduction', *Merleau-Ponty: The World of Perception*, London: Routledge, 2004, pp. 1–30.
12. Among the many theories proposing a functional basis for art from within an evolutionary model is one based on 'risk-free practice for later life'. If we were to actively indulge in new or alternative conceptions of the world, by testing them on the 'active' stimuli continually being thrust upon us, then this would pose huge risks to ongoing survival if these conceptions were to prove inadequate. Art's function, therefore, is proposed as a 'safe' means via which to explore our interactions with the world. See Ellen Dissanayake, 'What Art Is and What Art Does: An Overview of Contemporary Evolutionary Hypotheses', *Evolutionary and Neurocognitive Approaches to Aesthetics, Creativity, and the Arts*, ed. by Colin Martindale, Paul Locher, and Vladimir M. Petrov, Amityville, New York: Baywood Publishing, 2007, pp. 1–14.
13. Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1964), 'The Intertwining—the Chiasm', *The Visible and the Invisible*, ed. by Claude Lefort, tr. by Alphonso Lingis, Evanston, ILL.: Northwestern University Press, 1968, pp. 130–55.
14. Alva Noë, 'Life Is The Way the Animal is in the World: A Talk with Alva Noë' <http://www.edge.org/3rd_culture/noe08/noe08_index.html> [accessed November 2009]
15. Immanuel Kant (1790), *Critique of Judgment*, tr. by J. C. Meredith, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952, pp. 168–69.
16. Arthur Schopenhauer (1844), *World as Will and Representation*, tr. by E. F. J. Payne, 2 vols, New York: Dover Publications Inc., 1967, p. 409.
17. Julian Young, *Nietzsche's Philosophy of Art*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 170.
18. Young, *Heidegger's Philosophy of Art*, p. 180.
19. The nineteenth-century essayist and critic Walter Pater declared that 'all art constantly aspires towards the condition of music', describing other forms of art as burdened by an inextricable link to some kind of material base which one needs to distinguish from the art itself. See Walter Pater, *The Renaissance: Studies in Art and Poetry*, London: MacMillan, 1877.
20. Mont Sainte-Victoire, 1902–4. See <<http://www.philamuseum.org/collections/>>
21. Images can be found at <<http://www.tate.org.uk/britain>>
22. Paul Crowther, *Phenomenology of the Visual Arts (Even the Frame)*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009, p. 25.
23. This aspect of 'the image' is of course evidenced in many visual phenomena and is not claimed, therefore, as a definitive feature of art in particular, but as one aspect among many it can use.
24. Young, *Heidegger's Philosophy of Art*, p. 166.
25. The influence of 'process' as a methodology most commonly recognised in art, emerged in the 60s and 70s with art movements like Fluxus. Often participatory in its method, artists aimed to instigate situations or 'events' that might prompt interactions between audience and artwork, therefore extending the idea of 'art' beyond its object-base and stressing its temporal and 'relational' aspects; see Nicolas Bourriaud, *Relational Aesthetics*, tr. by Simon Pleasance and Fronza Woods with the participation of Mathieu Copeland, Dijon: Les Presses du réel, 2002. For some artists, the move away from the object as the outcome of art practice was also perhaps systematic of a response to the commodification of art and the modern excesses of the art market.
26. Examples at <<http://www.guggenheim.org/new-york/>>
27. Multiple examples at <<http://www.anthonymccall.com>>
28. James Turrell, 'Let There Be Light', in *Imagine*, UK: BBC, 2008, 60 mins.
29. R Irwin, 'The State of the Real. Part 1. A Conversation with Jan Butterfield', *Arts*, 46, 1972.
30. Multiple examples at <<http://www.anishkapoor.com/>>

31. Alva Noë, 'Art as Enaction', in *Interdisciplines* online conference, 2002 <<http://www.interdisciplines.org>>
32. J. A. McMahon, *Aesthetics and Material Beauty: Aesthetics Naturalized*, New York: Routledge, 2007, p. 234.
33. J. A. McMahon, 'Towards a Unified Theory of Beauty', *Literature and Aesthetics*, 9, 1999, 7-27, p. 23.
34. Multiple examples at <<http://www.spliteye.com/serra/exhibition>>
35. Sean O'Hagan, 'Richard Serra: The Interview', *The Observer*, 05.10.2008, pp. 6-7.
36. Alva Noë, 'Experience and Experiment in Art', *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, 7, 1999, pp. 123-35.